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LAW, LITERATURE, AND CONTRACT: AN ESSAY IN REALISM
Blake D. Morant*
In this Essay, the Author examines contract doctrine's weaknesses as
applied to issues of race and gender. By contrasting the doctrinal silence
concerning these issues with facts and circumstances that may have
influenced the results in specific cases, the Author challenges classical
contract theory's assertion of objectivity and its associated assumption of
bargaining equality as an integral component of each contract. The
Author then uses literature as an illustrative tool to highlight contract
law'sfailings in contexts where bargainingdisparitiesrelated to race and
gender issues are present. This approach is not meant to eliminate
contract rules but rather to lessen their formalistic nature to make
contract rules more effective. Accordingly, the Article establishes that a
law and literature analysis not only exposes flaws in the contract
doctrine but demonstrates the need for a more flexible application of
contract rules in cases involving race and gender disparity.Arguing that
prejudicial behavior must be addressed and pre-empted in order to
prevent its harmful effects in the formation of contracts, the Author again
uses literatureto develop a framework to remedy the biased conduct that
leads to inequalitiesin contractformation.
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INTRODUCTION
At first glance, the tenets of contract and literature appear
antithetical. Contract law has a seemingly objective, dispassionate

quality.1 On the other hand, literature embodies the essence of

human emotion and spirit.2 From initial appearances, no two genres
could be more disparate. The union of the two within one analytical
exercise seems more like an exercise in contradiction than informed
legal analysis.
Yet, like most seeming paradoxes in law, finding a correlation

between literature and contract presents an intriguing challengeone that tests the efficacious function of contract rules within the
more humanistic context created by prose. The results of this intersection can be both revealing and fascinating.
Indeed, this exercise places the application of contract rules
within the realistic context of human interaction. Further, as explained in more detail below, the evaluative constructs of literature
expose the limited functionality of contract doctrine as it applies to

issues of race and gender.
This Essay examines the weakness of the rules of contractual
formation as they apply to bargaining circumstances that implicate

1. See Larry A. DiMatteo & Saint Thomas Aquinas, The Counterpoise of Contracts:
The Reasonable Person Standardand the Subjectivity of Judgment, 48 S.C. L. REv. 293, 306,
310 (1997); see also Clare Dalton, An Essay in the Deconstruction of Contract Doctrine,94
YALE L.J. 997, 1001-02 (1985) (stating that "[contract] doctrine favors objective interpretations... over subjective ones"); Melvin A. Eisenberg, Expression Rules in
Contract Law and Problemsof Offer and Acceptance, 82 CAL. L. REv. 1127, 1130-31 (1994)
(recognizing the objectivity in contract law as it relates to a "directly observable state
of the world"); Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Responsive Model of Contract Law, 36 STAN. L.
REv. 1107, 1110, 1115 (1984) (discussing the "classical school's" requirements of
standardization and objectivity); Blake D. Morant, The Relevance of Race and Disparity
in Discussions of Contract Law, 31 NEW ENG. L. REv. 889, 890 (1997) (commenting on
contract law's "illusion of empiricism") [hereinafter Morant, Race and Disparity];
Kevin M. Teeven, Decline of Freedom of Contract Since the Emergence of the Modern
Business Corporation, 37 ST. Louis U. L.J. 117, 126 (1992) (explaining the relationship
between objectivity and "freedom of contract").
2. For a general description of the law and literature movement, see infra notes
79-100 and accompanying text.
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issues such as race and gender inequality.3 This exercise will not
concern itself solely with the failure of these rules, for such a critique
alone would not reconcile rigid contractual dogma with issues of
disparity.4 However, the detailed scrutiny of contract rules within
the world of prose provides an opportunity to test the effectiveness
of those rules and highlights the need for their more flexible application to variant transactional circumstances.
Part I of the Essay will delineate contract law's seeming disassociation with issues such as gender and race. The genesis of this
illusion remains situated in the traditional, albeit classical, notion of
contract theory. However, the portrayal of cases and circumstances
that implicate race and gender will dispute classical contract theory's illusory posture of objectivity.
To demonstrate further the lack of complete objectivity in bargaining transactions, Part II will describe the evaluative mechanism
afforded by the law and literature movement. The general analytical
framework afforded by this movement reveals the problems associated with applying rigid contract rules to bargaining situations that
implicate issues of race and gender disparity. Literature serves to
illustrate the operation of disparity in the formation of bargains. My
aim here will be to contrast the reality of disparity's operation with
contract dogma's egalitarian approach to such problems. To this
3. Rules of law often have dubious effects given their ubiquitous application in
cases with varying facts. See Cass R. Sunstein, Problems with Rules, 83 CAL. L. REV.
953, 957 (1995) (noting that rules are often "too crude"). When issues of race or gender are involved, legal rules, particularly those that are not specifically designed to
accommodate such issues, can not only be crude but can lead to misconceptions and
create false perceptions. See Richard H. McAdams, Cooperation and Conflict: The
Economics of Group Status Production and Race Discrimination,108 HARV. L. REV. 1003,
1007, 1081 (1995). Given these observations, I, too, have cautioned against the overreliance on rigid rules of contract as they apply to issues of reduced bargaining
power. See Blake D. Morant, Contractual Rules and Terms and the Maintenance of Bargains: The Case of the Fledgling Writer, 18 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 453, 455-57
(1996) [hereinafter Morant, ContractualRules and Terms].
4. I employ the term "disparity" as a generalized description of bargaining
contexts that include bargainers who operate under some disadvantage that can
often be associated with unequal bargaining power or knowledge of the parties to an
agreement. See David Millon, Default Rules, Wealth Distribution, and Corporate Law
Reform: Employment at Will Versus Job Security, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 975, 989 (1998)
(defining unequal bargaining power in terms of differences in bargaining skill,
bargaining leverage, and the ability to impose costs with the intent to gain an advantage in bargain negotiations); Steve D. Shadowen & Kenneth Voytek, Economic
and Critical Analyses of the Law of Covenants not to Compete, 72 GEO. L.J. 1425, 1447
(1984). Consequently, those who possess superior bargaining power or knowledge
relating to the bargain's subject matter may exploit this advantage through opportunistic or pejorative behavior. Bias or prejudice may influence both this behavior
and other actions affecting bargaining decisions. See infra notes 119-133 and accompanying text. As a possible trigger of bias, disparity can implicate issues of gender,
race, class, or comprehension.
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end, a telling scene from the screenplay for the motion picture Places
in the Heart' will provide probative illustration.
Part II will further explore the reality of disparity within the
bargaining relationship. With the portrayal of the operation of disparity within bargaining contexts established, this section provides a
more probative explanation of bias and prejudice. A brief explanation of social cognition will provide some proof of the reality of bias
and prejudice within the bargaining context.
This portion of the Essay will also provide an operational
framework to remedy the biased conduct that creates disparity issues within bargaining contexts. A portion of John Grisham's book
and the motion picture A Time to Kill6 illustrate that biased behavior
must be preempted or, at the very least, confronted to remedy its
effects.
Part III of the Essay will also distill the lessons learned from the
intersection of literature and contract theory. Humanism and realism, so prevalent in literature, become key determinants. They force
the reevaluation of contract rules in light of their effectiveness and
application.
My ultimate thesis here remains grounded in reality rather than
illusion. Contract rules, which are more formalistic in nature,7
should be applied with a degree of realism to correct deficiencies
relevant to disparity in bargaining contexts. The goal is not to demolish contract rules, but to enhance their efficacy and remedial
potential.8
I. THE FORMALISM OF CONTRACT RULES AND THE
REALITY OF BARGAINING BEHAVIOR

A. The InterpersonalNature of Contract
Matters of disparity 9 appear to have little relevance or analytical
import to the doctrine of contract law. Conventional wisdom
supports this notion. Think of the countless, everyday, somewhat
mundane contracts that occur with regularity: the purchase of

5.

PLACES IN THE HEART (Tri-Star Pictures 1984).

6.
7.

A TIME TO KILL (Warner Brothers 1996).
See infra notes 47-49, 161 and accompanying text.

8.

A complete retreat from contractual rules has never been my credo. How-

ever, these rules must be scrutinized carefully in distinct situations to ensure efficacy
and utility. See Morant, Contractual Rules and Terms, supra note 3, at 462; see also

Sunstein, supra note 3, at 1023 (suggesting that a practice of casuistry is needed for
the proper interpretation of rules).
9. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
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5

groceries; payment of mortgages or rent; and perhaps an automobile
negotiation, which involves gamesmanship if not an immense
degree of patience.'0 None of these agreements appears to implicate
issues relevant to race or gender. And discussion of these issues
within the context of bargained transactions seems irrelevant, if not
superfluous. As a consequence, my own initial pedagogy of contract
law included the avoidance of disparity issues in the discussion of
transactional issues in the field."'
The seeming empiricism of contract may be little more than an
egalitarian facade. 2 The avoidance of race and gender as influential
issues in bargaining can be disingenuous for a number of reasons.
To ignore disparity when it is evident from the facts begets a fragmentary analysis at best. 3 This tactic remains completely inapposite
to my prevalent thinking, which calls for utilizing analytical methods that fit the contextual circumstances of a bargain 4
Issues related to race and gender inevitably arise during discussions of some notable judicial decisions that involve bargaining
relationships. Moreover, the facts of these cases provide a relevant
basis for the consideration of race or gender in the bargaining relationship, or the decision-maker's resolution of disputes arising from
that relationship.
In the renowned case of Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co. 5
an African American mother on government assistance signed a
preformed contract for the purchase of sundry household items from
the Walker-Thomas Furniture Co. 6 The contract contained an onerous provision that allowed the company to repossess all items
purchased by Mrs. Williams, regardless of the total amount paid on

10. See Idaho Sheet Metal Works, Inc. v. Wirtz, 383 U.S. 190, 202-03 (1966) (citing
House Conf. Rep., p. 25; 95 Cong. Rec. 11003-04; 95 Cong. Rec. 12502) (1966)
(acknowledging that the sundry consumer transactions that are commonplace in the
market include transactions with grocery stores, hardware stores, coal dealers,
automobile dealers, clothiers, dry goods merchants, department stores, etc.).
11.
See Morant, Race and Disparity,supra note 1, at 889-94.
12. See id. at 891-92.
13. See id. at 896-99.
14. A number of scholars have acknowledged the importance of a contextual
approach to the scrutiny of legal problems. See David R. Barnhizer, Prophets, Priests,
and Power Blockers: Three Fundamental Roles of Judges and Legal Scholars in America, 50
U. Prr. L. REv. 127, 159 (1988); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 1479, 1479 (1987); William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey,
Statutory Interpretationas PracticalReasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321, 375-77 (1990). For

a discussion of the importance of race as a contextual element in legal pedagogy, see
generally Frances Lee Ansley, Race and the Core Curriculum, 79 CAL. L. REv. 1512
(1991).
15.
16.

350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
Id. at 447.
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her account.17 Eventually, the Court of Appeals found that provision
unconscionable. 8
Various factors led to the court's ruling in Williams. Of paramount importance was Mrs. Williams' disparate bargaining
position. Her limited education and financial means underscored
her lack of sophistication in that bargaining context.'9 The court intimated that Mrs. Williams, given her limitations, could not have
been expected to understand the full import of the default provision
contained in the adhesion contract. 2° The totality of this factual circumstance contributed to the court's finding of procedural
unconscionability. 2 1 The form of the contract notwithstanding, Mrs.
Williams' status as a woman of color on government assistance may
have implicated gender and race as potential factors that influenced
the contract's genesis. This, in turn, may have affected the resolution
of resultant disputes.22
The United States Supreme Court's decisions in City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.23 and Adarand Constructors,Inc. v. Pena,24 both
of which invalidated minority set-aside contracting programs, thrust
the issues of race and gender into the public's consciousness.3 Even
17. See id. at 447-50.
18. See id. at 449 (acknowledging that Mrs. Williams, as an unsophisticated
bargainer, could not have been expected to understand the full import of the default
provision).
19. See Eric Mills Holmes & Dagmar Thiirmann, A New and Old Theory for Adjudicating Standardized Contracts, 17 GA. J.INT'L & CoMP. L. 323, 397 (1987) (noting that
Williams focused on the "exploitation of the underprivileged, unsophisticated, uneducated and the illiterate") (quoting Hawes v. Kansas Farm Bureau, 710 P.2d 1312,
1314 (Kan. 1985)); Douglas Kari, Buchwald v. Paramount: Minding Hollywood's
Business, ENT. L. REP., May 1991, at 3, 5 (describing Mrs. Williams as "impoverished
and unsophisticated").
20. Williams, 350 F.2d at 449.
21. The difference in bargaining power, or the presence of a preformed agreement authored by the more powerful bargaining party, evinces procedural
unconscionability. Substantive unconscionability involves the presence of a contract
or a term thereof that is patently unfair. See Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Bargain Principle and Its Limits, 95 HARv. L. REv. 741, 752-53 (1982) [hereinafter Eisenberg, The
Bargain Principle]; Arthur Allen Leff, Unconscionability and the Code-The Emperor's
New Clause, 115 U. PA. L. REv. 485, 488 (1967) [hereinafter Leff, Unconscionabilityand
the Code]. For more on unequal bargaining power, see supra note 4 and accompanying text.
22. See Morant, Race and Disparity,supra note 1, at 927-30 (suggesting that gender
and socioeconomic status factored into the court's decision and, therefore, implying
that race could not have been ignored in the reasoning).
23. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
24. 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
25. In Croson, the Supreme Court invalidated the City of Richmond's minority
set-aside program and required a firm evidentiary basis for any affirmative action
policy directed toward the inclusion of traditionally excluded groups identified by
race. Croson, 488 U.S. at 510. As a result, such programs would be subject to stricter
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the famous case of In re Baby M,26 involving Mary Beth Whitehead, a
woman of modest means who contracted to serve as a surrogate
mother in exchange for compensation provided by a more affluent
bargainer, tacitly involves issues of gender and class, and overtly
involves concerns of morality and illegality. Indeed, in many controversies involving principles of contract, factors of race, ethnicity,
or gender can play a tangential, if not pivotal, role in the formation
and adjudication of many binding obligations.28

scrutiny, with a mandate that they be narrowly tailored to accomplish a remedial
purpose. Id. at 507. The Supreme Court solidified its stance regarding government
contracting set-aside programs in Adarand. In this case, the Court required that
federal set-aside programs, similar to those adopted by the states, survive strict
scrutiny analysis. Adarand, 515 U.S. at 222. Consequently, these programs must be
narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling governmental interest. Id. The federal
government could not implement an affirmative action program solely on the basis
of perceived discrimination. Id. at 226. In effect, the standard of proof applied to
programs designed to remedy discrimination based upon race or gender had been
heightened significantly.
26. 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988).
27. In In re Baby M, the Supreme Court of New Jersey clearly indicated its displeasure with the surrogacy arrangement between the Stems and Mary Beth
Whitehead. Id. at 1249. The contextual circumstances of this case clearly implicate
issues of gender and class. The court's opinion noted that Mrs. Whitehead was a
woman of modest financial means. Id. The Sterns, on the other hand, were highly
educated and economically secure. Id. Even though the parties carefully crafted their
agreement to avoid conflict with the state's baby selling statute, the court found the
agreement invalid in light of overwhelming public policy concerns. Id. at 1250. See
also Morant, Race and Disparity, supra note 1, at 936-38 (arguing that disparity in
bargaining must be viewed to include any group, including women, whose bargaining options are hindered by prejudice or stereotypes).
28. See, e.g., In re Greene, 45 F.2d 428 (S.D.N.Y. 1930) (holding that a formal,
written contract between a woman and a married man, with whom she had previously maintained an adulterous relationship, could not be enforced due to policy
concerns imbued in marriage, notwithstanding the contract's formal recitation of
consideration); Kirksey v. Kirksey, 8 Ala. 131 (1845) (holding that brother-in-law's
promise to provide sister-in-law a suitable home on his property if she would "quit
the country" and move did not constitute a binding promise, even though she moved
to his property in reliance on that promise and was subsequently evicted without
apparent cause); Hewitt v. Hewitt, 394 N.E.2d 1204 (111. 1979) (holding that an unmarried woman in a "family-like" relationship complete with children and other
"respectable appearances" could not sustain a promissory estoppel claim for
spousal-like support against her presumed husband, notwithstanding his promises
to sustain her because of her continued support and personal sacrifice to ensure his
professional education and subsequent pedodontia practice); Feinberg v. Pfeiffer Co.,
322 S.W.2d 163 (Mo. App. 1959) (sustaining a promissory estoppel claim against a
former employer who promised Ms. Feinberg a monthly pension for her many years
of superior and loyal service, noting the extent of reliance on her part, and tacitly
observing that a woman of advanced age, suffering with cancer would experience
difficulty in acquiring gainful employment); Wood v. Lady Lucy Duff Gordon, 118
N.E. 214 (N.Y. 1917) (maintaining the validity of an exclusive dealings contract
between an agent and Lady Lucy Duff Gordon, irrespective of arguments of a possible lack of mutuality on the agent's part, and further noting that such agreements
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The contextual circumstances presented by notable contract
decisions compel a readjustment of contract pedagogy and demand
a more probative analysis of bargaining relationships. Thus, factors
of racial or gender bias command attention, particularly when they
can impact the formation or judicial interpretation of agreements. 3°
A more persuasive reason to investigate issues of bias and
prejudice in contractual relations extends beyond the mere presence
of gender or race as factual circumstances. Study of these factors
relates to the very nature of the bargaining relationship. Negotiation
and ultimate consummation of a contract represent an interpersonal
exchange in which parties seek each other out and evaluate the merits of a potential deal in terms of what the other party may offer and
who that party represents. 3' Factors related to race, gender, or class
can easily influence judgments based upon facts gathered during the
pre-bargain phase of a transaction.3 ' This thought process may also
have an effect on both the willingness to seek out a bargain with an
individual and the ultimate terms of that bargain.3 To a large extent,
this occurs as a manifestation of the bargainer's lack of perfect information, 34 which can justify remedial action once the bargain breaks
down.

contain an implied, good faith term for the parties to utilize "reasonable efforts" in
the fulfillment of their duties); Helmick v. Cincinnati Word Processing, Inc., 543
N.E.2d 1212 (Ohio 1989) (allowing a meritorious claim of detrimental reliance to
enforce a specific promise of job security as an exception to the employment at-will
doctrine, in a case involving sexual misconduct in the workplace).
29. See Morant, Race and Disparity, supra note 1, at 898-99 (noting the issue of
race in Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965)).
30. See id. at 898-99, 938-39.
31. Relational theorists appreciate the notion that bargains represent an exchange with interpersonal dynamics. See Ian R. MacNeil, Relational Contract: What We
Do and Do Not Know, 1985 Wis. L. REv. 483 (1985). See generally Steven R. Salbu, The
Decline of Contract as a Relationship Management Form, 47 RUTGERS L. REv. 1271 (1995)
(reviewing the different functions of contracts and explaining their evolution).
32. See infra notes 126-128 and accompanying text.
33. See infra notes 130-133 and accompanying text.
34. -Imperfect information during precontractual negotiations often causes problems for bargainers. See Robert J.Condlin, Bargaining in the Dark: The Normative
Incoherence of Lawyer Dispute Bargaining Role, 51 MD. L. REv. 1, 8 (1992) (discussing
the difficulties faced in dispute bargaining as a result of imperfect information);
Barry Perlstein, Crossing the Contract-Tort Boundary: An Economic Argument for the
Imposition of Extracompensatory Damages for Opportunistic Breach of Contract, 58
BROOK. L. REv. 877, 882 (1992) (stating that contracts would be "self-executing if
information is perfect both during the formation of the contract and through its
performance").
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B. Contract Theory--Classicism,Neoclassicism, and Paternalism
The traditional, albeit classical, theory of contract fails to
mention or accommodate issues of racial or gender bias in bargaining relationships. To appreciate this weakness, one must first
comprehend the foundational underpinnings of traditional contract
theory.
The traditional notion of bargain formation has a formulaic
fixation with bargaining autonomy. This relates directly to the
laissez faire movement that was prevalent during the nineteenth
century.35 Pursuant to this line of thinking, parties must be free to
seek out and fashion their own agreements with minimal institutional intrusion. 3 Nonetheless, contractual freedom, a foundational
element of classicism, has definite boundaries and limits that focus
on policy concerns related to paternalism. 7 Furthermore, the limitations on contractual freedom signal a potential problem with the
strict adherence to the classical theory of contract.
35. A primary feature of classical contract thinking is the idea of freedom to
contract. This concept can be traced back to the laissez faire movement of the nineteenth century. See Timothy Davis, Balancing Freedom of Contract and Competing Values
in Sports, 38 S. TEX. L. REV. 1115, 1118 (1997) (discussing the influence nineteenth
century laissez faire thinking had both on classical contract law and on modem
contract law); Adam B. Seligman, Individualism as Principle:Its Emergence, Institutionalization, and Contradictions,72 IND. L.J. 503, 509 (1997) (noting the use of classical
impediments to contract to preserve the individual freedom to contract).
36. See Samuel Williston, Freedom of Contract, 6 CORNELL L.Q. 365, 366 (1921)
(recognizing that philosophers of the late eighteenth century advocated freedom as a
guiding postulate. "Freedom" has its definitional base in the Declaration of Independence and reflects Jeffersonian democracy, thereby facilitating individual action
and minimizing governmental activity or interference); see also Lochner v. New York,
198 U.S. 45, 53 (1905) (indicating that an individual's right "to make a contract in
relation to his business [constitutes a] liberty of the individual protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment"), overruled by West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379
(1937); MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM (1962) (discussing the need for
economic freedom as a means to achieving political freedom); Duncan Kennedy,
Distributiveand PaternalistMotives in Contract and Tort Law, With Special Reference to
Compulsory Terms and Unequal Bargaining Power, 41 MD. L. REV. 563, 570 (1982)
(recognizing that "[flreedom of contract is freedom of the part[ies] from the state as
well as freedom from imposition by one another").
37. See West Coast Hotel, 300 U.S. at 391-92 (overruling Lochner on the ground
that law may infringe upon liberty to protect against "evils which menace the health,
safety, morals, and welfare of the people"); Darby Dickerson, Bailor Beware: Limitations and Exclusions of Liability in Commercial Bailments, 41 VAND. L. REV. 129, 138
(1988) (noting that courts should not honor parties' freedom to contract, thereby
allowing exculpatory clauses absent legislation to the contrary); Morant, Contractual
Rules and Terms, supra note 3 at 469-70 (noting that "[piresent views of 'the freedom
of contract' recognize it may have limitations"); Note, Efficiency and a Rule of "Free
Contract":A Critique of Two Models of Law and Economics, 97 HARV. L. REV. 978 (1984);
see also infra notes 57-71 (discussing various approaches to paternalism and limitations on freedom of contract).
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Classicism also mandates that parties rigidly adhere to
contractual rules in order to form a binding agreement. 3' The
promise, together with some mutuality demonstrated by an
exchange of consideration, constitutes the heart of an enforceable
bargain.39 When truly voluntary bargainers conform to these rules of
engagement, the conventional wisdom is that a binding, enforceable
agreement results. 40
A key element of voluntariness is consent, a mandatory requisite of any valid agreement.41 Such consent must be authentic to
justify ultimate enforcement of the contract. 42 While not exclusive of
43 consent essentially
consideration,
justifies the enforcement of valid
44
agreements.
Originally, subjective intent, substantiated by a meeting of the
minds, dominated the consent inquiry.45 However, subjectivity is a

38. See MICHAEL J. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE 106-07 (1982);
Michel Rosenfeld, Contract and Justice: The Relation Between ClassicalContract Law and
Social Contract Theory, 70 IOWA L. REv. 769, 777-84 (1985).
39. See RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 1 (1932); see also 1 E. ALLAN
FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 3.1, at 161 (2d ed. 1990) (discussing the
assent requirement in the bargaining process); 1 SAMUEL WILLISTON & WALTER H.E.
JAEGER, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 22 (3d ed. 1957) (stating that the
manifestation of mutual assent is essential to the formation of a contract).
40. See Robert A. Hillman, An Analysis of the Cessation of ContractualRelations, 68
CORNELL L. REV. 617, 653 (1983) (stating that "the very purpose of a contract is to
ensure performance"); Steven R. Salbu & Richard Braham, Strategic Considerations in
Designing Joint Venture Contracts, 1992 COLUM. BuS. L. REv. 253, 305 (1992) (noting
that contracts "perform the traditional legal role of enunciating the terms... and
help[ing] to ensure performance or to fashion a remedy in the absence of performance"); see also Henry N. Butler & Barry D. Baysinger, Vertical Restraints of Trade as
Contractual Integration: A Synthesis of Relational Contracting Theory, Transaction-Cost
Economics, and Organizational Theory, 32 EMORY L.J. 1009, 1038-39 (1983) (stating that
"the underlying [goal] of both the classical and neoclassical [contract law] systems
is... 'to enhance the utilities created by choice-generated exchange but not necessarily those created by other kinds of exchange' ... [such as] the restructuring of a
contract, long after the offer and acceptance, in order to uphold the relationship of
the contracting parties") (quoting Macneil, Contracts: Adjustment of Long-Term Economic Relations Under Classical, Neoclassical, and Relational Contract Law, 72 Nw. U.L.
REv. 854, 872 (1978)).
41.
See supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text.
42. Randy E. Barnett, ... And ContractualConsent, 3 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 421,
424 (1993)i see also Randy E. Barnett, A Consent Theory of Contract, 86 COLUM. L. REV.
269, 270 (1986) (arguing that "[c]onsent is the moral component that distinguishes
valid from invalid transfers of alienable rights"). Professor Barnett further states that
the consent theory not only provides a foundation for the "objective" approach to the
determination of contractual intent but also explains "the enforcement of certain
commitments where no bargained-for exchange exists." Id. at 270, 297-309.
43.
See supra note 39.
44.
See Morant, Race and Disparity,supra note 1, at 905-07.
45.
See generally JOHN D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, THE LAW OF
CONTRACTS § 1-4(b), at 8 (3d ed. 1987) (explaining the historical importance of
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rather amorphous standard of proof and was eventually augmented
46
by a more objective manifestation of assent. To complete the enforceable agreement, objective assent had to be accompanied by an
exchange of promises.47 These rules formed the basis of the bargain
principle which lives on today as a determinant of contractual validity. 8 In fact, decision-makers cling to the basic rules of contract
formation as justifications to invalidate agreements.49

subjective intent in contract law). See also E. Allan Farnsworth, "Meaning" in the Law
of Contracts, 76 YALE L.J. 939, 943 (1967) (stating that the belief that a "meeting of the
minds" was required for a contract originated in the sixteenth century); E. Allan
Farnsworth, The Past of Promise: An Historical Introduction to Contract, 69 COLUM. L.
REv. 576, 576-77 (1969) (arguing that prior to contracts, parties voluntarily determined the terms of an exchange); Roscoe Pound, The Role of the Will in Law, 68 HARV.
L. REv. 1, 3 (1954) (discussing how subjective intent played a significant role in
Roman law, English law, and the law of continental Europe in the third century and
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, respectively).
46. See Randy E. Barnett, The Sound of Silence: Default Rules and Contract Consent,
78 VA. L. REV. 821, 857-59 (1992); 1 ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS
§ 72 at 304, § 73 at 310 (1963).
47. See Metro Communications Co. v. Ameritech Mobile Communications, Inc.,
984 F.2d 739, 744 (6th Cir. 1993) (illustrating that the prerequisites for contract formation are offer, acceptance, and consideration); Tsiatsios v. Tsiatsios, 663 A.2d
1335, 1339 (N.H. 1995) (stating that "[o]ffer, acceptance and consideration are essential to contract formation"); Serand Corp. v. Owning The Realty, Inc., No. C-941010,
1995 WL 653846 (Ohio Ct. App. 1995) at *2 (stating that elements of an effective
contract are offer, acceptance, and consideration); Jenkins v. County of Schuylkill,
658 A.2d 380, 383 (Pa. Super. 1995) (stating that "[it is black letter law that in order
to form an enforceable contract, there must be an offer, acceptance, consideration or
mutual meeting of the minds"); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 1
(1979) (defining a contract as "a promise or set of promises for the breach of which
the law gives a remedy, or the performance of which the law in some way recognizes
as a duty"). The Uniform Commercial Code states that a "'contract' means the total
legal obligation which results from the parties' agreement as affected by this Act and
any other applicable rules of law." U.C.C. § 1-201 (1989). For more detailed descriptions of the variety of definitions of the term "contract," see Orville C. Snyder,
Contract-Factor "Legal Hypothesis?", 21 MISS. L.J. 304 (1950). See also Dennis Patterson, The Pseudo-Debateover Default Rules in Contract Law, 3 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 235,
236 n.3 (acknowledging efficiency theory as a descriptive tool in contract law and
adopting the Restatement's definition of contract as "[a] contract is not a certain sort
of promise. Rather, a contract is a promise 'for the breach of which the law provides
a remedy' ").
48. Compare Eisenberg, The Bargain Principle,supra note 21, at 743-48 (discussing
the reasons supporting the bargain principle), with Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The
Principles of Consideration, 67 CORNELL L. REv. 640 (1982) (discussing the bargain
principle but suggesting it is only one of many different conditions of enforceability).
49. Courts will generally void a contract if the contracting parties fail to adhere
to the rules of contract formation. See Project Dev. Group, Inc. v. O.H. Materials
Corp., 766 F. Supp. 1348, 1352 (W.D. Pa. 1991) (stating that offer, acceptance, and a
manifestation of assent are required for contract formation); Local Union 529, United
Bhd. of Carpenters v. Bracy Dev. Co., 321 F. Supp. 869, 875 (W.D. Ark. 1971)
(requiring the manifestation of mutual consent and obligation for a binding contract);
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The twentieth century ushered in a more realistic notion of
contract. This was bound to occur for a number of reasons. The real
world complexities of bargaining relationships do not always
conform to the rigid constructs of classicism!" Moreover, the
formalism of the classical theory of contract can be awkward in the
real world context. Legal rules, given their inherent rigidity, can be
crude as they apply to variant circumstances.5' Thus, unrelenting
reliance upon rules as the cure-all can be flawed. 2
The apparent shortcomings of contract rules prompted a more
elastic approach that included fairness in the evaluation of bargains. 3 Aware of some of the shortcomings of classicism,
neoclassicists sought to mollify classicism's harshness with a degree
of realism.m Neoclassicism, to a limited extent, revised the classicist's
notion of obligation. The requirements for an enforceable agreement
were somewhat liberalized, and impediments to the enforcement of

Lonergan v. Scolnick, 276 P.2d 8, 10 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1954) (voiding a contract for
lack of valid offer).
50. See Morant, Race and Disparity,supra note 1, at 910 (observing that within the
real world of relationships, "consent is not formed in a sterile environment, protected
from pejorative external influences," i.e., prejudice, opportunism, avarice, and bias).
51. See Sunstein, supra note 3, at 957 (stating that "[o]ften rules will be too crude,
since they run up against intransigent beliefs about how particular cases should be
resolved"). Professor Richard McAdams seems to echo this sentiment regarding the
pejorative characteristic of rules ("law" in his terms) within the context of racial
discrimination, as it relates to individualized sacrifices on behalf of groups. See
Richard H. McAdams, Cooperation and Conflict: The Economics of Group Status Production, 108 1-ARV. L. REV. 1003, 1007 (1995). McAdams notes that, notwithstanding the
crudeness of law, it may nonetheless significantly influence individual perceptions
and attitudes:
Law is more crude than an intellectual critique, yet it is inherently
more public, and can carry more weight. When Jim Crow laws mandated certain forms of segregation, whites confidently spoke of
segregation as the natural order of things; when the laws forbade
segregation, discriminatory whites had a greater difficulty believing
their own ideology. Rationalizations can be fragile things; sometimes
they require that dissent be held to a minimum.
Id. at 1081.
52. See supra note 51 and accompanying text; see also Morant, Contractual Rules
and Terms, supra note 3, at 462 (explaining that "[diecision-makers and bargainers
should ...examine the utility of ...rules in light of the parties' overall goals and

expectations"); Sunstein, supra note 3, at 1023 (arguing for the need for "flexible,
contextual interpretations of rules").
53. See generally Ralph James Mooney, The New Conceptualism in Contract Law, 74
OR. L. REV. 1131 (1995) (discussing the push for fairness as an equitable variable in
twentieth century contractual theory) [hereinafter Mooney, The New Conceptualism in
Contract Law].
54. For more discussion of legal realism, see infra note 161.
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certain bargains were acknowledged. Under the neoclassicist's
notion, certain promises could be enforced without the requisite
element of consideration. 6
Neoclassicism also permitted intrusion in the performance
and culmination of the bargain to protect certain parties from
improvident agreements. Thus, paternalism surfaced as an operative goal in certain contracts.17 Decision-makers could more
actively police the pejorative behavior of certain bargainers,
thereby protecting the weaker party in the transaction. Of course,
paternalism can vary in form and serve several goals, including

55. For an explanation of neoclassical theory of contract law, see Jay M. Feinman,
The Significance of Contract Theory, 58 U. CIN. L. REV. 1283, 1285-89 (1990); Oliver E.
Williamson, Transaction-CostEconomics: The Governance of ContractualRelations, 22 J.L.
& ECON. 233, 235-38 (1979). See also Daniel A. Farber, Contract Law and Modern Economic Theory, 78 Nw. U. L. REV. 303, 319-22 (1983) (providing a cogent explanation of
the "neoclassical" model of contract theory, which, inter alia, supports the enforcement
of bargained promises). More specifically, a significant amount of scholarship has been
dedicated to the neoclassical theory of contract law as it relates to the traditional, contractual paradigm. See Eisenberg, The Responsive Model of Contract Law, supra note 1, at
1111 (indicating that neoclassical contract theory should be elaborated upon in order to
ensure that the theory encompasses principles which are "intellectually coherent and
sufficiently open-textured to encompass the complex and evolving realities of contract
as a social institution"). See generally Eisenberg, The Bargain Principle, supra note 21
(discussing the limits on the enforceability of the bargain principle); Melvin A. Eisenberg, Donative Promises, 47 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1979) (discussing the impact of substantive
and administrative concerns on the enforceability of formal and informal gifts and other
donative promises); Eisenberg, The Principles of Consideration, supra note 48 (criticizing
the axiomatic school and calling for a more careful scrutiny of enforceable promises to
ensure that they are conscionable).
56. A promise that can be enforced if it induced reliance under prescribed circumstances is the essence of the promissory estoppel doctrine, which is now codified in
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1981). It has been eschewed as a blow to
the reality of true contract. See GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 57 (1974)
(stating that "the theory of contract, as formulated by Holmes and Williston ...[has]
gone into its protracted period of breakdown almost from the moment of its birth").
See HUGH COLLINS, THE LAW OF CONTRACT 115-16 (1986) (noting a rather
57.
narrow definition of paternalism in classical contract law and stating that paternalism appears in modern contract law as a means of preventing strong parties from
dominating weaker parties); DONALD VANDEVEER, PATERNALISTIC INTERVENTION 12
(1986) ("[A] paternalistic act is one in which one person, A, interferes with another
person, S,in order to promote S's own good."); Bailey Kuklin, Self-Paternalism in the
Marketplace, 60 U. CIN. L. REV. 649, 655 n.9 (1992) (providing sources that attempt to
define paternalism); Jonathan Simon, Power Without Parents: Juvenile Justice in a
Postmodern Society, 16 CARDOZO L. REV. 1363, 1372 (1995) ("Paternalism is often
defined as an exercise of control over an individual that purports to be implemented
in the interests of that individual, either overriding or filling in for unreliable or
nonexistent individual choices."); Kennedy, supra note 36, at 572 (suggesting paternalism requires the decision-maker's intervention to replace the will of a party with
what the decision-maker thinks is better for the party).
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economic efficiency and distributive fairness.58 By design, paternalism limits basic, contractual freedom in order to protect a
bargainer from either her own improvident actions 9 or external
harm caused by other, opportunistic bargainers. 60 Intrusion upon
bargains, regardless of its protectionist goals, invokes criticism
given its possibly erroneous assumptions that parties lack the
facility to fend for themselves, or that decision-makers can better
decide what is best for the parties. 6' This criticism is manifested
more pointedly in those cases where6 2the paternalism is designed
to protect the bargainer from herself.
The intrusive nature of paternalism becomes less troublesome when the bargainer is protected from external harms. 63
Protection of weaker parties from opportunistic stronger parties
in a bargain serves to level an otherwise disparate bargaining
field 4 The questionable nature of the bargainer's assent to the
harmful bargain may justify intrusion and diminish its criticism.
The bargainer's option to employ such protection lessens its
moral repugnance.
A mainstay of paternalism remains the somewhat moral
obligation to free impaired individuals from agreements or
58. See Anthony T. Kronman, Paternalism and the Law of Contracts, 92 YALE L.J.
763, 766-74 (1983). Kronman's example of distributive justice is the decision-maker's
refusal to allow disclaimers of the warranty of habitability in landlord/tenant relationships. The concept of unconscionability would also fit within the rubric of this
justification. See also Anthony T. Kronman, Contract Law and Distributive Justice, 89
YALE L.J. 472, 473 (1980) (noting such additional forms of distributive justice as usury
laws limiting interest rates, warranties of quality, and minimum wage laws)
[hereinafter Kronman, Contract Law and DistributiveJustice].
59. See Kronman, Contract Law and DistributiveJustice, supra note 58. See generally
Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REv. 1089 (1972) (delineating
generally the intersection of legal rules with paternalism and other mechanisms).
60. See JOEL FEINBERG, HARM TO SELF 12-16 (1986) (categorizing legal rules that
protect weaker parties from the opportunism of stronger parties as "soft paternalism"; "hard paternalism," on the other hand, seeks to protect bargainers from their
own actions).
61.
See Thomas Hudson, Note, Immutable Contract Rules, the Bargaining Process,
and Inalienable Rights: Why Concerns Over the Bargaining Process Do Not Justify Substantive Contract Limitations, 34 ARIz. L. REv. 337, 343-44 & n.61 (1992) (citing JOEL
FEINBERG, HARM TO SELF 23-26 (1986)).
62. See id.; JOEL FEINBERG, RIGHTS, JUSTICE, AND THE BOUNDS OF LIBERTY 117
(1980). An example of a paternalistic restriction designed to protect an individual
from her own acts would be the prohibition of the sale of alcoholic beverages on
certain days, or during certain hours of the day.
63. See FEINBERG, supra note 60, at 12.
64. The doctrine of unconscionability attempts to foster the paternalistic goals of
protecting weak or disadvantaged bargainers from onerous deals advanced by
stronger, more powerful bargainers. See infra notes 72-73.
65. See Hudson, supra note 61, at 344 n.66.
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provisions thereof, or to invalidate contracts that resulted from
some discrepancy in the bargaining process. 66 The motivations of
the bargaining parties, if based upon negative factors such as
opportunism, bias, or prejudice, could arguably justify
paternalistic intervention.
Paternalism forms the foundation for several mechanisms
that may rescue an impaired bargainer from an unfair or
improvident agreement. The concept of capacity, a justifiable
remedy given its nexus with assent and public policy, serves to
prevent enforcement of an agreement when the party is a minor
or is operating under some supervening disability. 68 Other

66. See F.H. Buckley, Three Theories of Substantive Fairness, 19 HOFSTRA L. REV. 33,
35 (1990) (arguing that "[e]fficiency explanations of substantive fairness norms are
more persuasive than distributional ones"). Nonetheless, I find Dean Kronman's
analysis both comprehensive and probative. For additional discussion of paternalism
in contract law, see, for example, Peter Benson, The Basis of Corrective Justice and Its
Relation to Distributive Justice, 77 IOWA L. REV. 515 (1992); Richard Craswell, Property
Rules and Liability Rules in Unconscionabilityand Related Doctrines,60 U. CHI. L. REV. 1
(1993); Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L.
REV. 1685 (1976); Kuklin, supra note 57; Arthur Allen Leff, Thomist Unconscionability,
4 CAN. BUS. L.J. 424 (1980); and MacNeil, supra note 31.
67. Opportunism focuses upon a bargainer's self-interest, which can prompt
behavior adverse to other bargainers. The definitions of opportunism range both by
fields of study and within these same fields. The most frequently cited definition
comes from economist Oliver Williamson, who defines opportunism as "self-interest
seeking with guile." G. Richard Shell, Opportunism and Trust in the Negotiation of
Commercial Contracts:Toward a New Cause of Action, 44 VAND. L. REV. 221, 228 (1991)
(quoting OLIVER WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS 26 (1975)). Another frequently cited definition is "when a
performing party 'behaves contrary to the other party's understanding of their
contract, but not necessarily contrary to the agreement's explicit terms, leading to a
transfer of wealth from the other party to the performer."' Id. (quoting Timothy J.
Muris, Opportunistic Behavior and the Law of Contracts, 65 MINN. L. REV. 521, 521
(1981)); see also George M. Cohen, The Negligence-Opportunism Tradeoff in Contract
Law, 20 HOFSTRA L. REV. 941, 957 (1992) (offering a broad definition of opportunism
as "any contractual conduct by one party contrary to the other party's reasonable
expectations based on the parties' agreement, contractual norms, or conventional
morality"). See generally Juliet P. Kostritsky, Bargaining with Uncertainty, Moral Hazard, and Sunk Costs: A Default Rule for PrecontractualNegotiations, 44 HASTINGS L.J.
621, 689-705 (1993) (advocating the use of default rules to prevent opportunism);
Perlstein, supra note 34, at 879 (advocating the use of tort damages to prevent opportunism); Richard E. Speidel, Article 2 and Relational Sales Contracts, 26 LOY. L.A. L.
REV. 789, 795-98 (1993) (discussing the threat opportunism poses to bargaining
relationships). Bias or prejudice can intersect with opportunism or function alone as
an influence on bargainers. See Morant, Race and Disparity, supra note 1, at 917
(asserting that motivation may provide the justification to analyze the legitimacy of
transactions affected by race and disparity).
68. See Morant, Race and Disparity,supra note 1, at 920 n.172.
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paternalistic devices include such mechanisms as duress,69
fraud,'0 and undue influence. 7'
Perhaps the most notorious paternalistic device is the concept
of unconscionability.72 The absence of meaningful choice by one of
the parties (procedural unconscionability) and the presence of an
onerous or unfair term (substantive unconscionability) constitute
69. Duress is an "unlawful threat or coercion used by a person to induce another
to act (or to refrain from acting) in a manner he or she otherwise would not (or
would)." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 504 (6th ed. 1990); accord RESTATEMENT (SECOND)

OF CONTRACTS §§ 174, 175(1) (1981). "A finding of duress at least must reflect a
conviction that one party ... [was] so improperly imposed upon by the other that a
court should intervene." In re Hellenic Lines, Ltd., 372 F.2d 753, 758 (2d Cir. 1967). A
contract entered into under duress is voidable at the discretion of the party suffering
duress. See Chouinard v. Chouinard, 568 F.2d 430, 434 (5th Cir. 1978). Duress is
predicated on the unlawful acts of the other party. See id. Thus, one who enters into a
contract because of an unfortunate financial situation or where the other party has
refrained from pursuing a legal right in exchange for the contract has not suffered
duress. See id.; see also HUGH GRAVELLE & RAY REES, MICROECONOMICS 248-53 (1981)

(discussing the stability of market equilibrium).
70. Fraud represents "[an intentional perversion of truth for the purpose of
inducing another in reliance upon it to part with some valuable thing... or to surrender a legal right." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 660 (6th ed. 1990). A statement is

fraudulent if the maker intends the statement to induce manifestation of assent and
the maker knows that the statement is not in accord with the facts, implies the truth
of the statement, and knows that he does not have a basis for the assertion. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 162 (1981). Like undue influence, the per-

son alleging fraud must show it by clear and convincing evidence. See id.
71. Undue influence is "[plersuasion, pressure, or influence short of actual force,
but stronger than mere advice, that so overpowers the dominated party's free will or
judgment that he or she cannot act intelligently and voluntarily, but acts, instead,
subject to the will or purposes of the dominating party." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY

1528 (6th ed. 1990). However, the mere existence of a confidential relationship does
not create a presumption that undue influence was exercised. See Bradbury v. Rasmussen, 401 P.2d 710, 714 (Utah 1965). The party alleging undue influence must
ordinarily prove it by clear and convincing evidence. See id.; Armstrong v. Anderson,
417 P.2d 326, 328-29 (Okla. 1966).
72. See supra note 21 and accompanying text. Courts have defined unconscionability as the "absence of a meaningful choice on the part of one party, together with
contract terms that are unreasonably favorable to the other party." Leasefirst v.
Hartford Rexall Drugs, Inc., 483 N.W.2d 585, 587 (Wis. Ct. App. 1992) (citing Discount Fabric House, Inc. v. Wisconsin Tel. Co., 345 N.W.2d 417, 424 (Wis. 1984)).
Similarly, the West Virginia Supreme Court describes unconscionability as an
"overall and gross imbalance, one-sidedness or lop-sidedness that justifies a court's
refusal to enforce a contract as written." McGinnis v. Cayton, 312 S.E.2d 765, 776
(W.Va. 1984); see also Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449
(D.C. Cir. 1965) (indicating that courts recognize unconscionability to include "an
absence of meaningful choice on the part of one of the parties together with contract
terms which are unreasonably favorable to the other party"). Furthermore, the doctrine is broken down into two components. See McGinnis, 312 S.E.2d at 777.
Substantive unconscionability is characterized as "unfairness in the contract itselfoverall imbalance, one-sidedness, laesio enormis, and the evils of the resulting contract," whereas procedural unconscionability "involves inequities and unfairness in
the bargaining process." Id.
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the general elements of an unconscionable agreement. 3 While
unconscionability has the potential to repair agreements damaged
by the pejorative influences of race and gender, its academic
constructs do not lend it to that use.74 The previously described5 case
of Williams v. Walker-Thomas FurnitureCo. illustrates this point. 7
Notwithstanding neoclassicism's amelioration of classicism's
rigidity, there remains a void regarding the conspicuous consideration of bias or prejudice issues in transactional relationships. None
of the paternalistic tools designed to police the legitimacy of bargains, i.e., duress, fraud, undue influence, or unconscionability,
includes factors of bias as elements that prompt a remedy. 76 This
omission has become more severe, if not pronounced, by the resurgence of classicism in recent, significant decisions.
With the foregoing predicate established, several key inquiries
emerge: How can parties or scholars highlight the possible pejorative function of bias or prejudice in bargaining relationships within
the confines of present contract rules? Equally significant, can parties insert this issue into the discourse concerning contract disputes
and remedies? The rapidly burgeoning field of law and literature
provides probative insight into these queries.
II. LAW, LITERATURE, AND CONTRACT THEORY-AN INTERSECTION

A. The Basic Constructs of Law and Literature
Because contract law ignores the operation of biased behavior
within bargaining circumstances,7 8 some catalyst is needed to demonstrate the operation of interpersonal modalities related to human

73.

Disparate bargaining positions of the parties have also been recognized as a

form of procedural unconscionability. For a complete explanation of the unconscionability doctrine, see Eisenberg, The Bargain Principle, supra note 21, at 752-53; Leff,
Unconscionabilityand the Code, supra note 21, at 488.
74. Cf. Morant, Race and Disparity,supra note 1, at 924 (stating that the concept of

race is not considered in the unconscionability doctrine).
75. See supra notes 15-19. Mrs. Williams' status as an African American woman
of color seems of little significance in the court's decision to grant her relief pursuant
to unconscionability. Williams, 350 F.2d at 448-50.
76.
See supra notes 68-73.
77.
See generally Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995); City of

Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989). The court adopts, in both cases, a
somewhat laissez faire attitude toward bargaining relationships. For more regarding
the seeming rise of classicism as an evaluative norm among judicial decision makers,
see generally Mooney, supra note 53, depicting the American contract jurisprudential
move from egalitarianism to an individualistic, conceptionalist model that facilitates
bargained-for exchanges.
78.

See infra Section II. B.
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perception. Literature can serve that function. Its unencumbered
nature allows the author to explore perceptional manifestations in
their most stark reality. Once exposed, this revelation can justify use
of remedial tools to blunt the effects of resultant biased behavior.
The interrelation of literature with contractual theory comes
from the very nature of the law and literature movement itself.79
Literature functions as a litmus test to illustrate the operation of law
within a variety of interpersonal contexts.'s And the prose created
demonstrates an interrelationship between society, culture, and the
law.81
Fiction comprises much of the literature in this movement.82 But
that factor does not diminish the effectiveness of the analysis it
bears. Indeed, fiction has historically been known to reflect, if not
influence, society. 3 Consequently, the examination of law and literature in tandem has rapidly developed into a movement with
substantial probative force m
Literature can operate metaphorically to explain the function of
law within human relationships and transactions. As a result, the
genre enriches our understanding of the law as a human artifactif
Analysis of its implications can provide some insight into societal
attitudes and norms. Fiction, particularly if it is probative and insightful, can reveal the applicability of legal principles to human

79. My admittedly cursory description of the law and literature movement is not
meant as a complete expose. Such an effort would require far more detail than this
Essay could offer. But one must attain some rudimentary understanding of this
movement to appreciate its intersection with contract theory.
80. See generally James Boyd White, What a Lawyer Can Learn from Literature, 102
HARV. L. REV. 2014 (1989) (expounding upon the proper focus of law and literature).
81. See Carol Sanger, Seasoned to the Use, 87 MIcH. L. REV. 1338, 1339 (1989)
(noting that the "shadows cast by legal fiction may be especially strong because of
the 'strikingly legalistic' character of American culture, where 'legal terms, images,
and scenarios infuse... conversations and imaginations' ") (quoting David Ray
Papke, The Advocate's Malaise: Contemporary American Lawyer Novels, 38 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 413 (1988) (book review)) [hereinafter Sanger, Seasoned to the Use].
82. See id.
83. See id.; Kathryn Abrams, Hearing the Call of Stories, 79 CAL. L. REV. 971, 973
(1991).
84. For general sources regarding the law and literature movement, see Richard
Weisberg, The Law-Literature Enterprise, 1 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 1 (1988); Law and
Literature: A Symposium, 29 RUTGERS L. REV. 223 (1976); Symposium: Law and Literature, 32 RUTGERS L. REV. 603 (1979); Symposium: Law and Literature,60 TEX. L. REV. 373
(1982); Symposium: Terror in the Modern Age: The Vision of Literature, the Response of
Law, 5 HUM. RTS. Q. 109 (1983).
85. See Debora L. Threedy, The Madness of a Seduced Woman: Gender, Law, and
Literature, 6 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 1, 15-16 (1996) (stating that literature that focuses on
law as legal themes should "enrich our understanding of law as a human artifact, as
a means of ordering society").
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interactions6 and suggest those relationships which should be
remedied.
Authors of literature operate freely, unencumbered by the
constraints of dogma or rules. They can readily explore the effect of
law's operation within a world replete with human frailties and
emotions such as love, fear, hate, anguish, passion and motivation,
and perception. This freedom can stretch the boundaries, allowing
the test of legal principles in a panoply of contexts that are difficult
to replicate in real life.
Great writers such as William Shakespeare often speak prophetically of either the changes law imposes on society or the
changes that are needed in the law itself. 87 Their works are generally
seen as the classics of literature.g Several of today's commercially
prominent writers, such as Scott Turow (Presumed Innocent) and John
Grisham (The Firm, A Time To Kill, The Chamber, The Rainmaker, Street
Lawyer), 9 further the literary exploration of law's operation within
the context of human interaction. 0
The analytical constructs of literature provide a nontraditional
method of evaluating the functionality of legal principles in society. 9
As such, it operates similarly to narrative and storytelling which

86. See id. at 15; see also James Boyd White, Law and Literature: "No Manifesto", 39
MERCER L. REV. 739, 751 (1988) (asserting that "[1literature and law are both about
reason and emotion, politics and aesthetics"). See generally Bruce L. Rockwood, The
Good, the Bad, and the Ironic: Two Views on Law and Literature, 8 YALE J.L. & HUMAN.
533 (1994) (reviewing DANIEL J. KORNSTEIN, KILL ALL THE LAWYERS? SHAKESPEARE'S
LEGAL APPEAL (1994) and IAN WARD, LAW AND LITERATURE: POSSIBILITIES AND
PERSPECTIVES (1995)).
87.
See Sanger, supra note 81, at 1342-43. Sanger includes Melville, Dickens,
Kafka, Faulkner, and Shakespeare as paradigms of the great authors. Id. at 1343.
88. Professor Deborah Threedy states that "[t]he accepted canon of law and
literature includes such standards as The Merchant of Venice by William Shakespeare,
Billy Budd by Herman Melville, The Trial by Franz Kafka, Bleak House by Charles
Dickens, and The Outsider by Albert Camus." Threedy, supra note 85, at 1-2. "These
five texts appear most frequently on law-and-literature reading lists." Id. at 2 n.3.
89. See James R. Elkins, Troubled Beginnings: Reflections on Becoming a Lawyer, 26
U. MEM. L. REV. 1303 (1996) (using the writings of John Grisham to examine legal
education).
90. The distinction between the great writers and the more modern, popular
author relates more to the establishment of literary credentials and worth than the
trust born in the analysis presented by their works, or than through commercial or
popular acceptance. The themes and analysis contained in the great authors' works
require less defense and gamer more immediate acceptance and credibility. See
Sanger, supra note 81, at 1343 n.19 (citing Parker, A Review of Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance with Some Remarks on the Teaching of Law, 29 RUTGERS L. REV. 318
(1976)).
91. See, e.g., Robin West, Authority, Autonomy, and Choice: The Role of Consent in
the Moral and Political Visions of Franz Kaka and Richard Posner, 99 HARV. L. REV. 384,
385 (1985) (utilizing Kafka's fiction to counter Judge Posner's view that consent
justifies the theory of wealth maximization).
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utilize contextual reality to test the effectiveness of legal rules and
judicial opinions. 92
As prose, literature's interpretation of legal conflicts and
principles is somewhat akin to narrative, 93 a persuasive tool used in
large measure by Critical Race and Feminist scholars. 94 Narrative
represents a fascinating dynamic in which the narrator delivers a
story designed to entice the audience to comprehend certain points
through shared norms or understood conventions. 95 It can describe
law as practice, impact and evaluate judicial decisions, and offer
new perspectives on problems suffered by divergent groups.96 The
law and literature movement shares these traits.
The constructs of the law and literature movement have two alternative, analytical prongs: (1) the search for the literary aspects of
law-that law and legal context have some literary significance (law

92. Many have used the terms "storytelling" and "narrative" interchangeably to
describe the genre of legal criticism designed to criticize or deconstruct legal theories
and rules as they apply to various circumstances. See, e.g., Michael A. Coffino, Genre,
Narrativeand Judgment: Legal and Protest Song Stories in Two Criminal Cases, 1994 WIS.
L. REV. 679, 681 (1994) (stating that "[a] narrative is a story about an event delivered
to an audience by a narrator"); Daniel Farber & Suzanna Sherry, Telling Stories Out of
School: An Essay on Legal Narrative,45 STAN. L. REV. 807 (1993) (using "legal storytelling" and "narrative" interchangeably) [hereinafter Farber & Sherry, Telling Stories];
Robert L. Hayman, Jr. & Nancy Levit, The Tales of White Folk: Doctrine, Narrative,and
the Reconstruction of Racial Reality, 84 CAL. L. REV. 377, 435-36 (1996) (approving the
interchangeable use of the terms "narrative" and "story") [hereinafter cited as Hayman & Levit, The Tales of White Folks]. Professors Jane B. Baron and Julia Epstein have
attempted to differentiate between storytelling and narrative. They define a "story"
as "an account of an event or set of events that unfolds over time and whose beginning, middle, and end are intended to resolve (or question the possibility of
resolving) the problem set in motion at the start." Jane B. Baron & Julia Epstein, Is
Law Narrative?, 45 BUFF. L. REV. 141, 147 (1997). They state that "narrative [signifies]
a broader enterprise that encompasses the recounting (production) and receiving
(reception) of stories ...[It organizes] certain kinds of problems into a form that
renders culturally meaningful both the problems and their possible resolutions." Id.
To Professors Baron and Epstein, stories are a subset of narrative. The distinction is
too fine for constructive analytical purposes; therefore, I use the terms interchangeably, with narrative dominating my discourse.
93. Several scholars describe narrative and its use in scholarship. See, e.g., John
0. Calmore, Critical Race Theory, Archie Shepp, and Fire Music: Securing an Authentic
Intellectual Life in a Multicultural World, 65 S.CAL. L. REV. 2129 (1992); Richard Delgado, Storytellingfor Oppositionists and Others: A Pleafor Narrative, 87 MICH. L. REV.
2411 (1989); Barbara J.Flagg, On Selecting Black Women as Paradigmsfor Race Discrimination Analysis, 10 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 40 (1995); Alex M. Johnson, Jr., Defending

the Use of Narrative and Giving Content to the Voice of Color: Rejecting the Imposition of
Process Theory in Legal Scholarship, 79 IOWA L. REV. 803 (1994).

94.
95.
96.
97.

See Johnson, supra note 93, at 813.
See Coffino, supra note 92, at 681.
See Hayman & Levit, The Tales of White Folks, supranote 92, at 434-37.
See generally supra notes 79-90 and accompanying text.
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as literature) ;98 and (2) the examination of the law-related content of a
literary work (literature explicating law).9 The latter prong can pointedly expose the effectiveness or failures of legal principles. It may also
reveal the function of bias within transactional relationships."5
B. A TransactionalNarrativefrom PLACES IN THE HEART
Perhaps the law and literature movement's most probative
power is its tendency to reveal law's nature and its implications in
the lives of individuals.' This can be particularly helpful when
testing the need for contract rules designed to correct or remedy
problems resulting from transactional irregularities. Like prose,
movies can also elucidate the efficacy of law with the circumstance
of human interaction.' 2 A poignant scene from the movie Places in
the Heart vividly demonstrates this point'

98. See PAUL GEWIRTZ, INTRODUCTION IN LAW'S STORIES: NARRATIVE AND
RHETORIC IN LAW 2, 34 (1996) (noting a comparison of law as literature with narrative); Anthony V. Alfieri, Race Trials, 76 TEX. L. REv. 1293, 1297 (1998) (discussing the
utility of the "law as literature" concept in the analysis of narrative); James B. White,
Law as Rhetoric, Rhetoric as Law: The Arts of Culturaland Communal Life, 52 U. CHI. L.
REV. 684, 693-97 (1985) (arguing that law is a form of rhetoric and, therefore, operates through members of the community in order to construct societal structures).
John Grisham speaks, albeit indirectly, to the notion of law having literary qualities.
In his personal note in his novel, A TIME TO KILL, Grisham observes that "[tihe greatest dramas occur not on screens or stages, but daily in countless courtrooms across
the country." JOHN GRISHAM, A TIME TO KILL ix (1989) (Author's Note).

99. See Sanger, Seasoned to the Use, supra note 81, at 1342.
100. See id. See generally, Gary Minda, Law and Literature at Century's End, 9
CARDOZO STUD. L. LITERATURE 245, 245-46 (1997) (discussing what law and literature has come to mean).
101. For example, Bruce L. Rockwood writes:
[Slome scholars pursue the detailed study of specific texts and
authors for the light they shed on the nature of law and its impact on
our lives.... [Hers] engage in the systematic introspection required
for the application of critical theory.., in an attempt to make a place
for the law and literature movement within, or as a continuation of.
modem and postmodern intellectual history.
Bruce L. Rockwood, Book Review--The Good, the Bad, and the Ironic: Two Views on Law
and Literature,8 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 533, 533 (1996) (reviewing DANIEL J. KORNSTEIN,
KILL ALL THE LAWYERS? SHAKESPEARE'S LEGAL APPEAL (1994) and IAN WARD, LAW
AND LITERATURE: POSSIBILITIES AND PERSPECTIVES (1995)).
102.
See generallyJohn Denvir, One Movie No Lawyer Should Miss, 30 U.S.F. L. REV.

1051, 1051 (1996) (discussing the benefit of analyzing movies to gain legal insights);
Norman Rosenberg, Professor Lightcap Goes to Washington: Rereading Talk of the
Town, 30 U.S.F. L. REV. 1083, 1083 (1996) (discussing varied interpretive lessons
gained from analyzing movies).
103. One may question the inclusion of a screenplay within the general body of
works called literature. While this term conjures notions of traditional, printed prose,
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A work of significant popular and commercial appeal, Places in
the Heart, involves a woman's fight against "poverty, racism, and
sexism while enduring back-breaking labor."' 4 The film chronicles
the dilemma of Edna Spaulding, a recently widowed woman in
Depression-era Texas. Following her husband's sudden death, Mrs.
Spaulding discovers that the mortgage on her family farm is in arrears. Without some appreciable income, the bank would foreclose
the mortgage loan and compel her family to live with relatives.
During a moment of intense despair, Mrs. Spaulding meets and
takes into her employ Moze, an African American drifter trying to
find work. Moze believes that Mrs. Spaulding's farm appears suited
to grow cotton. He further convinces her that "he knows all there is
to know about [growing] cotton."10 5 Mrs. Spaulding then resolves to
plant cotton and enters into an informal partnership with Moze. 106
To begin her grueling quest to grow and harvest cotton, Mrs.
Spaulding initiates a deal with the local merchant for cotton seed.
She specifies the grade of seed, and the merchant agrees to supply
the seed for a stated price. The merchant's employees then commence to load onto Mrs. Spaulding's truck a more inferior seed than
originally bargained for. Thanks to her knowledgeable partner,
Moze, Mrs. Spaulding calls the error to the merchant's attention. He
immediately apologizes for
10 7 the error and compliments Moze for
being a "credit to his race.,
Whether the seed merchant's error is intentional remains a mystery. As in real-life occurrences, this scene provides no clear
evidence of bad faith on the merchant's part. Nonetheless, the dia-

its definition cannot be narrowly confined to that type of writing. Literature encompasses a range of material, prose or verse, of an imaginative or creative nature. See
WEBSTER'S 3D NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1321 (1986)

(defining the term
"literature"). Accordingly, screenplays for motion pictures can be viewed legiti-

mately as literary works that analyze law and legal rules. Screenplays, and the
motion pictures they support, may be more deserving of such treatment in this
analytical exercise, given the inherent nature of those writings to display human
interaction so vividly.
104. VIDEOHOUND'S GOLDEN MOVIE RETRIEVER 697 (Martin Connors & Jim Craddock, eds., 1998). The accolades garnered by Robert Benton, author of the screenplay
for PLACES IN THE HEART, confirm his worth as a creator of literature and boost the
credibility of his work. The screenplay for PLACES IN THE HEART has received both an
Academy Award and New York Film Critics Award for Best Original Screenplay.
Benton has also received awards for the screenplays for BONNIE AND CLYDE and
KRAMER V. KRAMER. See id. For more information regarding awards for films, see also
IMDB Internet Movie Database(visited Nov. 24, 1998) <http://us.imdb.com>.

105.

See supra note 5.

106.
107.

For a general description of the plot of PLACES IN THE HEART, see id.
Id.
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logue and1 8actor's portrayal lead one to suspect the possibility of
deception.
But irrespective of deception, a curious query remains as to
whether reliance upon negative stereotypes and associated beliefs
influenced the merchant's conduct. It is plausible that he possibly
harbors beliefs and attitudes regarding the business acumen and
power of women and African Americans. His perceptions of Mrs.
Spaulding as an inexperienced, female bargainer and Moze as an
African American laborer, could have triggered those beliefs. 1 09 In
turn, those beliefs may have influenced his bargaining conduct in
108. A party to any contract has an affirmative duty of good faith and fair dealing
in its performance and enforcement. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS
§ 205 (1981); FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 7.17, at 310 (1990). Various scholars
have written extensively on the concept of good faith and fair dealing. See generally
Eric G. Andersen, Good Faith in the Enforcement of Contracts, 73 IOWA L. REV. 299
(1988) (proposing a working definition of contract enforcement and the good faith
requirement); Steven J. Burton, Breach of Contract and the Common Law Duty to Perform
in Good Faith, 94 HARV. L. REV. 369 (1980) (presenting a theory for distinguishing
good faith from bad faith); Steven J. Burton, Good Faith Performance of a Contract
Within Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 67 IOWA L. REV. 1 (1981) (articulating
the function of the good faith obligation under Article 2); Steven J. Burton, More on
Good Faith Performance of a Contract: A Reply to Professor Summers, 69 IOWA L. REV. 497
(1984) (offering a distinction between good faith and bad faith performance); E.
Allan Farnsworth, Good Faith Performance and Commercial Reasonableness Under the
Uniform Commercial Code, 30 U. CHI. L. REV. 666 (1963) (discussing the Code's provisions on good faith); Robert S. Summers, "Good Faith" in General Contract Law and the
Sales Provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code, 54 VA. L. REv. 195 (1968) (examining
good faith in contract case law and in Code provisions); Robert S. Summers, The
General Duty of Good Faith-Its Recognition and Conceptualization, 67 CORNELL L. REV.
810 (1982) (discussing the Restatement's view of good faith). See also Kerry L. Macintosh, Gilmore Spoke Too Soon: Contract Risks from the Ashes of the Bad Faith Tort, 27
LOY. L.A. L. REV. 483 (1994) (discussing the viability of the tort remedy of implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing for a breach of contract); Nina G. Stillman,
Wrongful Discharge: Contract, Public Policy, and Tort Claims, 527 PLI/Lit 313 (1995)
(discussing the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in the employment
context).
109.

Life for African Americans in Depression-era Texas, as in other southern

states, was characterized by poverty, racial bigotry, and legally imposed segregation
and inequality. See JOHN EGERTON, SPEAK Now AGAINST THE DAY: THE GENERATION
BEFORE THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT IN THE SOUTH 29-33 (1994). Southern society

also viewed women as naturally dependent and only competent in the domestic
sphere. See SARAH M. EVANS, BORN FOR LIBERTY: A HISTORY OF WOMEN IN AMERICA

203-04, 211 (1989). These historical circumstances supported a culture that viewed
both African Americans and women as pawns to be manipulated by those in control
of power and material resources. See EGERTON, supra. For discussion of the portrayal
of these attitudes and circumstances in film, see Douglas Y'Barbo, The Heart of the
Matter: The Property Right Conferred by Copyright, 49 MERCER L. REV. 643, 675-76
(1998), for a description of racial attitudes in the Depression-era South, utilizing the
film, DRIVING Miss DAISY (Warner Brothers 1989). See also Calvin Woodard, Listening
to the Mockingbird, 45 ALA. L. REV. 563 (1994) (discussing the excellent portrayal of
racial attitudes that were prevalent in the South during the Great Depression in the
film TO KILL A MOCKINGBIRD (Universal International Pictures 1962)).

Michigan Journalof Race & Law

[VOL. 4:1

the transaction for the cotton seed." While there is no definitive
proof of this dynamic, the contextual possibility of its operation
demands that it be explored as a factor in a complete analysis of the
transaction.
Mrs. Spaulding's transaction with the seed merchant, complete
with offer, acceptance, consideration, and delivery, comports with
the objective tenets of contract law.' Because the elements of a valid
contract are present, the result pursuant to classical theoretical
norms is the enforcement of the agreement, barring extraordinary
impediments.' 2 Ostensibly, this should provide Mrs. Spaulding
security, even in the face of the merchant's mistake. In fact, modem
contract law provides a remedy for this
3 error, albeit a difficult one
given the evaluation of risk allocation.1
Had Mrs. Spaulding discovered the erroneous seed delivery
subsequent to her encounter with the merchant, contract rules
would have provided for her right to reject the defective tender by
the merchant.14 However, the opportunity costs and emotional toll
associated with that remedy can be extensive. Moreover, the requirement of proof, particularly in the context of a parole agreement,
can loom as a formidable burden."'
To support a proffered remedy, the party seeking relief must
substantiate its imposition. The rejuvenated classical view of contracts further demands this predicate for intervention into the
bargaining relationship. 6 The motivation of the seed merchant to
attempt delivery of the lesser grade seed can serve as significant
justification for Mrs. Spaulding's remedy. 7 Surely his perception of
Mrs. Spaulding as an inexperienced woman, advised only by an
African American laborer, may have significantly influenced the
merchant's "mistake" in providing her the wrong seed. If not, at
least that perceptional possibility, evident from the context of the
bargain itself, demands exploration of this dynamic. Confirmation of

110.
111.
112.

See infra notes 123-133 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 45-49 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 47, 66-80 and accompanying text.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 151, 152, and 154 (1981); see also

113.
JOHN EDWARD MURRAY, JR., MURRAY ON CONTRACTS § 91 (3d ed. 1990) (providing a

comprehensive discussion of mistake as well as risk allocation).
114. Pursuant to the perfect tender rule, a buyer has the right to reject the whole
and any part of a tender of delivery that fails "in any respect to conform to the contract." U.C.C. § 2-601 (1989).
115. The traditional, unfettered right of rejection pursuant to the "perfect tender
rule" of U.C.C. § 2-601 has been tempered to avoid surprise rejection and general
opportunism by the buyer. See U.C.C. §§ 1-203, 2-504, 2-508, 2-605, and 2-608 (1989).
116. See Mooney, supra note 53 and accompanying text.
117. For more regarding the motivation to contract, see Morant, Race and Disparity, supra note 1, at 911-17.
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this behavior can substantiate not only the merchant's flawed delivery but also Mrs. Spaulding's right to relief.
Of course, Mrs. Spaulding's right to grade A seed is secured by
the oral terms of the agreement. Barring the impediments of proof
of those oral terms, her right to redress could be augmented
significantly by an analysis of the possible perceptional bias in the
transaction.
C. Perception, Social Cognition, and Marginalization
Bargainers' perceptions of one another may influence bargaining conduct to some extent. This certainly may have been a factor in
the bargaining relationship between Mrs. Spaulding and the seed
merchant, described above in the scene from Places in the Heart."9
The operation of perception and biases from within the consumer context is no new phenomenon. Indeed, it is likely as old as
contract law itself.
Many have noted the disparity with which women and individuals of color have been discriminated against in a variety of
transactional contexts. Controlled experimentation also confirmed
the operation of perception, attitudes, and beliefs within the specific
market of car sales.' 2' Courts have also confronted cases where

118. As a general postulate, a contract expressed orally is binding so long as the
elements of a binding agreement are present and the agreement is not subject to the
Statute of Frauds. See MURRAY, supra note 113, at §§ 68-80; U.C.C. § 2-201 (1989); see
also 2 CORBIN, supra note 46, at § 275 (providing a history of the statute of frauds);
Karl N. Llewellyn, What Price Contract?-An Essay in Perspective,40 YALE L.J. 704, 747
(1931) (discussing informal verbal modifications of written contracts).
119. See supra notes 106-107 and accompanying text.
120. See Ian Ayres & Peter Seigelman, Race and Gender Discriminationin Bargaining
for a New Car, 85 AM. ECON. REV. 304 (1995); John Yinger, Measuring Racial Discrimination with FairHousing Audits: Caught in the Act, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 881 (1986); Prime
Time Live: True Colors (ABC television broadcast, Nov. 26, 1992) (documenting the
travails of affluent-looking African Americans seeking housing and retail purchases).
See generally ELLIS COSE, THE RAGE OF A PRIVILEGED CLASS (1993); HENRY Louis
GATES, JR., LOOSE CANONS: NOTES ON THE CULTURE WARS (1992).
121. Perhaps the most compelling proof of the operation of perception in bargaining conduct is a controlled experiment performed by Ian Ayres. Professor Ayres
tested a theory that women and minorities were generally given worse deals when
they attempted to negotiate for a new car. Ian Ayres, Fair Driving: Gender and Race
Discrimination in Retail Car Negotiations, 104 HARv. L. REV. 817 (1991). He assembled
a number of individuals who would function as testers of the car market in metropolitan Chicago. Id. The testers were meticulously selected and trained to ensure
uniformity. Id. Ayres' study demonstrated that African Americans and women paid
substantially higher prices for the same vehicle as those offered to white males. Id.
Moreover, car dealers altered their bargaining techniques and goals based upon their
perception of the consumer. Id. For more discussion of the operation of perceptions
in personal and judicial decision making, see generally Jonathan K. Stubbs, Perceptual

Michigan Journal of Race & Law

[VOL. 4:1

allegations of discrimination based upon race have been central to
the disputes" 2 Others have highlighted the existence of biased behavior in the housing industry as well. 123 These cases and studies,
like Mrs. Spaulding's transaction in Places in the Heart, 1document
the fact that not all contracts are cast in a colorblind milieu. n
While anecdotal evidence indicates that, in certain instances,
individuals may rely upon attitudes and preformed beliefs in formulating bargains, social scientists provide a more persuasive
methodology that confirms the existence of biased conduct. Social
psychologists have often examined the influences perception has
on human behavior and term this phenomenon "social cognition. 1 26 Pursuant to this theory, individuals tend to use shortcuts
as a natural cognitive means to process information. Individuals
are bombarded by so much information that, as a consequence,

Prisms and Racial Realism: The Good News About a Bad Situation, 45 MERCER L. REV. 773
(1994), which discussed the prism model, a model that contends that people tend to
see the world differently according to their varying perceptions, and those differences affect human decision-making in judicial and other contexts.
122. See Perry v. Command Performance, 913 F.2d 99, 100 (3d Cir. 1990) (concerning
the refusal by a beauty salon hairdresser to serve a black woman). African Americans
and businesses with ties to the NAACP have historically suffered discrimination in
the sale of such goods as milk, bread, groceries, gas, credit, fertilizer, seed, insecticides, and farm machinery. See AMERICAN FRIENDS SERV. COMM. ET AL.,
INTIMIDATION, REPRISAL, AND VIOLENCE IN THE SOUTH'S RACIAL CRISIS (1959), re-

printed in Civil Rights-1959: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of
the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 1573 (1959). Cases have also
proved discriminatory actions in the sale of real estate. See, e.g., United States v.
Pelzer Realty Co., 484 F.2d 438, 442-43 (5th Cir. 1973) (holding that a real estate
agent's requirement that African American home-buyers either bring the agent
additional business or pay higher prices violated the Fair Housing Act).
123. Many sources note the prevalence of racial and sexual discrimination in both
the housing and automobile markets. See Joyce Jones, Let the Home Buyer Beware,
BLACK ENTERPRISE, Aug. 1997, at 19 (addressing the discrepancies in home insurance

coverage that occur along racial lines); Ed Morales, Apartment-heid, THE VILLAGE
VOICE, May 5, 1998, at 25 (discussing the continued existence of housing discrimina-

tion in New York despite a consent decree to increase minority housing percentages);
Emily Rosenbaum, Racial/Ethnic Differences in Home Ownership and Housing Quality,
1991, 43 SOC. PROBS. 403, 418 (1996) (finding that Black and Hispanic families were
less likely than White families to live in high-quality units and neighborhoods).
124. See supra notes 106-107 and accompanying text.
125. For more on colorblindness, see infra note 164 and accompanying text.
126.

See ELLIOT ARONSON, THE SOCIAL ANIMAL 5-8, 117-120 (1995). See generally

Donald C. Langevoort & Robert K. Rasmussen, Skewing the Results: The Role of Lawyers in Transmitting Legal Rules, 5 S.CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 375, 419 (1997) (discussing
how, in decision-making, people use mental shortcuts because of limited time, information, and cognitive capacity, which sometimes lead to miscalculations)
[hereinafter Langevoort & Rasmussen, Skewing the Results]; Herbert A. Simon,
Rational Choice and the Structure of the Environment, 63 PSYCHOL. REV. 129 (1956)
(dealing with people's decision-making when faced with multiple goals asserting
that rational behavior is closely related to perception and cognition).
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they require an abbreviated mechanism to process this panoply of
information efficiently. 127 Thus, individuals may resort to categorizations or stereotypes to speed cognitive processes. 28 Known as
heuristics, this process
9 can occur naturally as an almost automatic
response mechanism.
If implemented by the bargainers, behavior influenced by
heuristics could manifest itself as bias and prejudice.3 These
influences on judgment can operate tacitly or unconsciously.' This
is particularly true if the perceiver fails to recognize distinctions
between the individual perceived and the group to which that
individual belongs. This, in turn, can be the precursor to unfair or
inequitable bargains. 33
In the scene from the film Places in the Heart, described above,'
the seed merchant's perception of Mrs. Spaulding, a woman with no
experience in bargaining assisted by a person of color who is assumed to possess little knowledge of the transaction, may have
spurred the merchant's carelessness in tendering the lower grade of
cotton seed.'35 The merchant's utilization of stereotypes associated
with those groups could have easily influenced his bargaining conduct with individuals of those groups-Mrs. Spaulding and Moze.
127. See supra note 126 and accompanying text. See generally Hal R. Arkes, Costs
and Benefits of Judgment Errors: Implications for Debiasing, 110 PSYCHOL. BULL. 486
(1991) (noting generally the efficiency in streamlining informational processes, which
ultimately affects behavior).
128. Stereotypes include acquired or learned beliefs, generally associated with
distinct groups. See Patricia G. Devine, Stereotypes and Prejudice: Their Automatic and
Controlled Components, 56 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 5, 6 (1989); Duncan Kennedy, A CulturalPluralist Casefor Affirmative Action in Academia, 1990 DUKE L.J. 705,
710; Mary F. Radford, Sex Stereotyping and the Promotion of Women to Positions of
Power, 41 HASTINGS L.J. 471, 489 (1990).
129. See A. TVERSKY & D. KAHNEMAN, JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES (1974); STEVEN J. SHERMAN & ERIC CORTY, Cognitive Heuristics, in
HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL COGNITION 189-286 (R.S. Wyer & T.K. Skruell, eds., 1984). See

generally ARONSON, supra note 126 (discussing dissonance theory and the effects on
behavior).

130. See Jody Armour, Stereotypes and Prejudice: Helping Legal Decisionmakers Break
the Prejudice Habit, 83 CAL. L. REV. 733, 742 (1995) [hereinafter Armour, Stereotypes
and Prejudice].
131. See Martha Chamallas, The Architecture of Bias: Deep Structures in Tort Law,
146 U. PA. L. REV. 463, 472 (1998) (discussing the subconscious role race may play in
the decision of a juror).
132. Langevoort & Rasmussen, Skewing the Results, supra note 126, at 420 n.94; see
also Dale F. Wyatt & Donald T. Campbell, On the Liability of Stereotype or Hypothesis,
46 J. ABNORMAL AND SOC. PSYCHOL. 496 (1951).
133. The description of heuristics is admittedly abridged given the natural constraints of this Essay. The goal, nonetheless, is to provide some basic understanding of
the social psychological implications of relationships within the bargaining context.
134. See supra notes 106-107 and accompanying text.
135. See supra notes 106-110 and accompanying text.
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The influence of stereotypes could be subtle or unconscious, a
state symptomatic of both the entrenchment of stereotypes in general and the automatic operation of heuristics. 13 6 In effect, the
merchant may have marginalized Mrs. Spaulding to the point where
he was not as vigilant as he would have been had he dealt with one
he perceived to be a more sophisticated customer. 37
It is important to note that individuals may not automatically
behave in accordance with learned categorizations. In fact, individuals may know of stereotypes and actively avoid their
implementation in the decision on how to behave. In some instances, affirmative steps
can be taken to halt the natural use of
39
negative stereotypes.1
But the absence of biased behavior cannot be assumed, particularly if a factual predicate for such behavior exists. Scrutiny of
disputed bargains, therefore, requires analysis of the possible operation of negative stereotypes and biases to prompt and justify relief.
For this reason, decision-makers should examine the role each
party's bargaining position and attitudes played in the transaction.
D. The Influence of Perception-A TIME TO KILL

The influence of perception as it relates to conduct can be quite
powerful. But recognition of that power should prompt action to
halt the ill effects of bias on bargaining conduct. When a factual
context such as the one demonstrated in the scene from Places in the
Heart implicates bias resulting from perception, decision-makers
must acknowledge its existence and operation. They should, accordingly, take affirmative steps to counter its adverse results in
cases where disadvantaged bargainers have little choice.' To this
end, literature can shed light on the need to address bias and dem-

136.

For more on unconscious racism, see generally Jody Armour, Race Ipsa Loqui-

tur: Of Reasonable Racists, Intelligent Bayesians, and Involuntary Negrophobes, 46 STAN.
L. REv. 781, 811-14 (1994) [hereinafter Armour, Race Ipsa Loquitorl; Armour, Stereotypes and Prejudice, supra note 130, at 742, which discussed the relationship between

acknowledged stereotypes and personal beliefs.
137. Similarly, in the case of Williams v. Walker-Thomas FurnitureCo., 350 F.2d 445
(D.C. Cir. 1965), Mrs. Williams could have been marginalized in her dealings with
the furniture company, given her lack of financial prowess and choice. See supra
notes 15-22, 75 and accompanying text.
138. See generally Armour, Race Ipsa Loquitur, supra note 136.
139. See Armour, Stereotypes and Prejudice, supra note 130, at 750-60 (arguing that
non-prejudiced personal beliefs must be summoned to offset the unconscious discrimination that can occur from stereotyping).
140. Armour endorses the use of tactics that prompt individuals to employ nonprejudicial beliefs in their thought processes. Id. at 757-60.
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onstrate effective methods to halt the influence of negative stereotypes on judgment and behavior.
A Time to Kill, John Grisham's first, favorite, and perhaps best
novel to date, echoed themes of racism, revenge, and equal justice
under the law in the state of Mississippi.'41 An actual rape trial inspired the story, in which a young girl testified against a man who
had brutally raped her.142 Grisham's book and the commercially
successful film of the same name serve to underscore the powerful
tool of narrative as an illustrative device in legal theory.143 Both the
book and, more vividly, the film depict the powerful influence that
perception has on conduct and judgment. T4
The central story line focused on Carl Lee Hailey, an African
American family man, accused of killing two rednecks who had
viciously raped his ten-year-old daughter. Jake Brigance, a young,
relatively inexperienced attorney, agreed to defend Carl Lee. Conflicts swirled around Jake's ability to proffer a credible and effective
defense in the wake of intense racial angst that permeated the small
Mississippi town where the events transpired.' Whether Carl Lee
could receive a fair and unbiased trial in the face of racial tensions in
the town and the seating of an all-White jury became the omnipresent issue.
In his closing argument, Brigance challenged the jury to focus
beyond the element of race."4 Through the imagery of a parent's
grief, he induced the jury to identify emotionally with Carl Lee Hailey147 In effect, Brigance sought to alter the jury's judgment base-to
reject or disregard attitudes or beliefs grounded in race and focus
more upon a universal sense of fairness and justice. Interestingly, the

141. See GRISHAM, supra note 98; Robert A. Creo, An Essay on Professionalism: The
Portrayalof Lawyers in PopularFiction, 146 PITTSBURGH LEGAL J. 7, 11 (1998) (discussing
Grisham's portrayal of lawyers in A Time to Kill).
142. See supra note 141.
143. See Leonard M. Baynes, A Time to Kill, the O.J. Simpson Trials, and Storytelling
to Juries, 17 LOY. L.A. ENT. L.J. 549, 552-58 (1997) (exploring A Time to Kill as an

example of storytelling).
144. VIDEOHOUND'S GOLDEN MOVIE RETRIEVER, supra note 104, at 907. The
screenplay for the movie was written by Akiva Goldsman. See id.
145. See generally id.
146. Grisham evoked a tacit premise: the impact of the rape of the child would be
greater if the all-White jury could identify more with the victim; i.e., if the victim
were also White. GRISHAM, supra note 98, at 455-56.
147. Grisham's idea for this transference of pathos originated from his own feelings of empathy. While witnessing the actual rape trial on which A Time to Kill was
based, Grisham was moved by the testimony of the young rape victim. He then
personalized the rage he believed the family sensed. He states, "I wondered what I
would do if she were my daughter. As I watched her suffer before the jury, I wanted
personally to shoot the rapist. For one brief yet interminable moment, I wanted to be
her father. I wanted justice. There was a story there." Id. at ix-x.
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book and film implemented this attitudinal trigger in a strikingly
dissimilar manner.
In the book, Grisham took a less direct approach to confronting
biased behavior. He attempted to counter the biased judgments
premised on race with an appeal to the universality of intense human suffering, identifiable to anyone regardless of race-a more
colorblind approach. Jake Brigance's closing argument in the book
included the following:
Suppose ... your ten year-old daughter is raped, and
you're a Vietnam vet, very familiar with an M-16, and
you get your hands on one while your daughter is lying
in the hospital fighting for her life. Suppose the rapist is
caught, and six days later you manage to maneuver to
within five feet of him as he leaves court. And you've
got the M-16. What do you do? 14
Grisham's narrative then reads inter alia:
[Jake] wanted to leave [the jury] with one thought. Picture this if they could. When she was lying there,
beaten, bloodied, legs spread and tied to trees, she
looked into the woods around her. Semiconscious and
hallucinating, she saw someone running toward her. It
She
was her daddy, running desperately to save her ...
149
needs him now... Let him go home to his family.
In the book, Grisham's character successfully diverts the jury's
attention from race, particularly that of an African American killing
two white men. He prompted the jurors to focus instead on the rape
of a child, the senseless and shameful tragedy that led to the kill-

ings.i5
The screenwriter for the motion picture confronted the challenge more pointedly. Recognizing that the all-White jury may fixate
more on the racial dynamics of the case, 5 1 Akiva Goldsman overtly
triggered nonprejudiced beliefs. Brigance's closing argument targeted the racial subtext by use of imagery. He sought to alter the
jurors' perception (based on stereotype) to evoke more sympathy for

148. Id. at 483.
149. Id. at 483-84.
150. In the novel, the success of Brigance's tactics is evidenced by the jury's verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity. Id. at 508.
151. In the film, it was clear that Jake Brigance and Carl Lee Hailey were concerned that the jury would not be totally impartial on race. This was particularly
troublesome to the pair given that the facts indicated that an African American man
had killed two White men. See supra note 6.
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the true victim, thereby helping the father. Brigance poignantly
states:
I set out to prove a black man could receive a fair trial
in the South. That we are all equal in the eyes of the law.
That's not the truth, because the eyes of the law are
human eyes-yours and mine. And until we can see
each other as equals, justice is never going to be evenhanded. It will remain nothing more than a reflection of
our prejudices. So until that day we have a duty under
God to seek the truth, not with our eyes, not with our
minds with fear and hatred ... but with our hearts. But
we don't know better.
I want to tell you a story. I'm going to ask you all to
close your eyes while I tell you this story. I want you to
listen to me. I want you to listen to yourselves. Go
ahead, close your eyes, please.
This is a story about a little girl walking home from the
grocery store one sunny afternoon. I want you to picture this little girl. Suddenly a truck races up. Two men
jump out and grab her. They drag her into a nearby
field, and they tie her up, and they rip her clothes from
her body. Now they climb on-first one, and then the
other-raping her, shattering everything innocent and
pure; vicious thrusts in a fog of drunken breath and
sweat. And when they're done, after they've killed her
tiny womb, murdered any chance for her to bear children, to have life beyond her own, they sat and used her
for target practice. So they started throwing full beer
cans at her, thrown so hard that it tears the flesh all the
way to her bones.
Then they urinate on her.
Now comes the hanging. They have a rope. They tie a
noose. Imagine the noose going tight around her neck, a
sudden blinding jerk. She's pulled into the air, her feet
and legs go kicking-they don't find the ground. The
hanging branch isn't strong enough. It snaps and she
falls back to the earth. So they pick her up, throw her in
the back of the truck, drive out to Foggy Creek Bridge,
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pitch her over the edge. She drops some thirty feet
down to the creek bottom below.
Can you see her-her raped, beaten, broken bodysoaked in their urine, soaked in their semen, soaked in
her blood, left to die? Can you see her? I want you to
picture that little girl. [pause] Now, imagine she's
white. [pause] The defense rests, your honor.
The impact and implication were clear: if Brigance could neutralize the all-white jury's racially biased perception of his client's
actions by changing the victim of the underlying crime of rape from
black to white, he could engender more sympathy for the actions of
his client. His imagery sought to trigger the nonprejudiced beliefs of
the jurors by inducing their empathy.
Brigance's tactic to neutralize the jury's negative, racial
perception as it applied to his client's slaying of two white men does
not suggest that race is an irrelevant factor in the overall dynamics
of the case. That idea would be ludicrous because racial attitudes
and bias permeate the novel's story line.' s4 Yet his strategy prompts
decision-makers to ignore or reject unconscious, prejudiced beliefs
through recognition of the tacit operation of those beliefs in
cognitive decision-making.15 Brigance's appeal to pathos diverts the
jury's focus from the image of a black man shooting two white men, to
a distraught father seeking justice for the brutal rape of his prepubescent daughter. Father/daughter empathy eclipses the
black/white character of the case.
Employment of race-neutralizing tactics as a means to lessen biased decision-making does not eliminate racial prejudice. To the
contrary, the very need to implement this strategy contradicts that
notion. It does, however, contribute to informed decision-making by
blunting the influence of unconscious or tacit bias.
Scenes from both the novel and the film of A Time to Kill
illustrate the potential effectiveness of techniques that neutralize the
effects of negative stereotypes and beliefs premised on race. These
literary works also underscore the potential to alter such

152. A TIME TO KILL supra note 6.
153. See supra notes 139-140 and accompanying text; see also Robin D. Barnes,
Interracial Violence and Racialized Narratives: Discovering the Road Less Traveled, 96

COLUM. L. REv. 788, 796-97 (1996) (discussing the use of the imaginative empathy
form of narrative in A TIME TO KILL).
154.

See supra notes 141-146.

155.

See Armour, Stereotypes and Prejudice, supra note 139, at 742-45 (stating that

triggering nonprejudiced beliefs may lead to balanced and less biased decision-

making).
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evaluations, even within the transactional world of contracts. Active
use of mechanisms to prompt nonprejudice beliefs can possibly
thwart discriminatory conduct. This practice, in turn, can exert a
positive influence on bargaining behavior. But as discussed in more
detail below, bias-reduction tactics can succeed only when decisionmakers construe and apply the rules of contract more broadly.
III. THE LESSONS OF LITERATURE-THE NEED FOR
REALISM AND HUMANISM

The most telling point that scholars and adjudicators of
contracts can glean from the law and literature movement must be
to view contract rules more fluidly. This of course means that
contractual rules, in the abstract, cannot be viewed as panaceas in all
situations.5 7 The present tendency to do so may be due to the
overestimation of the power of rules to alter bargaining conduct.'
Rules, by their rigid nature, fail to be all things in all situations given
the multiplicity of human variables. 9 In fact, the rigidity of sterile
contractual rules may be disadvantageous to distinct groups of
bargainers.16° At best, rules must be applied contextually to function

effectively as tools of security and justice. This is not to say that rules
should be abandoned; rather, they should be interpreted in view of

the dynamics of interpersonal exchanges that occur within the
transactional relationship.
156. The use of triggering devices to thwart discriminatory conduct in bargaining
relationships implies the use of methods that encourage bargainers to contract with
individuals with whom they generally have not bargained, i.e., people of color,
women, and the disabled. See supra notes 139 & 140. The traditional mechanism for
encouraging such "counter perceptual" bargaining is the use of programs such as
set-asides in government contracts. The Supreme Court has limited the use of such
programs by subjecting them to strict scrutiny review. See Adarand Constructors,
Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469
(1989). The limitations imposed on the use of these programs suggest the need to
develop alternative means to entice people to move beyond their perception-based
biases in bargaining relationships. The intriguing nature of this doctrinal intersection
notwithstanding, a complete analysis of these programs in light of social cognition
extends beyond the bounds of this Essay and, therefore, must be reserved for future
discussion.
157. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
158. See Barbara A. Fure, Contracts as Literature: A Hermeneutic Approach to the
Implied Duty of Good Faith and FairDealing in Commercial Loan Agreements, 31 DUQ. L.
REv. 729, 751 (1993) (stating that contract rules do not succeed because they are
premised on careful bargaining by bargainers sensitive to the threat that contract
rules can impose).
159. See supra notes 3, 51-52 and accompanying text.
160. See Leah Guggenheimer, A Modest Proposal: The Feminomics of Drafting Premarital Agreements, 17 WOMEN'S RTs. L. REP. 147, 151, 208 (1996) (stating that the
current use of premarital agreements is unfair to women).
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The formalism imbued in contract law should accommodate
flexibility, reflective of an analytical approach based upon realism. 6'
This tactic does not supplement the standard operation of contractual
rules which emphasize objective manifestations of a bargain.6 1 Instead, this tactic causes decision-makers to fuse the application of
these rules with consideration of the attitudinal dynamics that permeate any bargaining relationship. Such an approach, of course, destroys
the assumption that all deals are struck with total objectivity,163164i.e.,
without the impact of categorizations based upon race or gender.

161. Legal realism arose in the early twentieth century in response to the dogmatic formalism displayed in Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915), which allowed
workers to contract with their employers without state interference. Realism uses
social condition as an operative factor in decision-making; strict reliance on legal
rules thus becomes a potentially unnecessary and awkward exercise. From a realist's
perspective, the decision-maker should apply legal rules contextually in view of the
circumstances that influence the conduct of the parties. See Gregory A. Mark, Realms
of Choice: Finance Capitalismand CorporateGovernance, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 969, 974 n.17
(1995) (defining legal realism as the integration of social science into the realm of
law). For a discussion of the development of legal realism, see KERMrr L. HALL, THE
MAGIC MIRROR, LAW IN AMERICAN HISTORY, 269-71 (1989); Edward A. Purcell, Jr.,

American Jurisprudence Between the Wars: Legal Realism and the Crisis of Democratic
Theory, in AMERICAN LAW AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER, 359, 359-63 (Lawrence
M. Friedman & Harry N. Scheiber, eds., Harvard Univ. Press 1988); G. Edward
White, From Realism to Critical Legal Studies: A Truncated Intellectual History, 40 Sw.

L.J. 819, 821-25 (1986).
162. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
163.
For more regarding the pseudo-objectivity of contract law and the deconstruction of contract principles as they relate to society, see Clare Dalton, An Essay in
the Deconstruction of Contract Doctrine, 94 YALE L.J. 997, 1039-66 (1985); see also Morant, Race and Disparity, supra note 1, at 892 (stating that the "truism of imperfect
objectivity led to the rise of the neoclassicists in the field [of contracts]").
164. The tendency to view bargaining relationships objectively, without consideration of the implication of bias related to gender or race, is directly related to the
concept of colorblindness. Justice Harlan, in the dissent of Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S.
537 (1896), probably originated the concept of "colorblindness," stating that "[o]ur
Constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens."
Id. at 559. In more modem times, the concept has been repudiated by a number of
scholars. See Anthony R. Chase, Race, Culture, and Contract Law: From the Cottonfield to
the Courtroom, 28 CONN. L. REV. 1, 51-52 (1995) (declaring that "the 'colorblind'
approach is impossible"); Frank R. Parker, The Damaging Consequencesof the Rehnquist
Court's Commitment to Color-blindness Versus RacialJustice, 45 AM. U. L. REV. 763, 773
(1996) ("Color-blindness is a pathology, a disease of the eye. In striving for a colorblind society, the Supreme Court [in recent decisions involving civil rights and
affirmative action] is turning a blind eye to the gross racial inequities that pervade
American society ....); Katheryn K. Russell, Affirmative (Re)Action: Anything but
Race, 45 AM. U. L. REV. 803, 805 (1996) (reiterating Justice Blackmun's concurring
statement in Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 407 (1978) that to get past
race, one must consider race). See generally T. Alexander Aleinikoff, A Case for RaceConsciousness, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1060 (1991); Ian Ayres, Narrow Tailoring, 43 UCLA
L. REV. 1781 (1996) (discussing whether the use of quotas or credits in affirmative
action programs would meet the narrowly tailored prong of strict scrutiny analysis);
Bryan K. Fair, The Acontextual Illusion of a Color-Blind Constitution, 28 U.S.F. L. REV.
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In effect, traditional contract rules can be too crude and
inflexible in some contexts and make little allowance for the
operation of the human spirit in relationships. Shakespeare makes
reference to this fallacy of contract law in his classic work, Merchant
Of Venice.16 The play vividly underscores the limitation of
contractual rules that in that166context, do little to foster amity and
trust between the bargainers.

Despite its benefits, the analytical merit of the law and literature
may not be immune
movement, i.e., literature explicating law,
from criticism. Because of its nexus with narrative, critics may
ascribe such faults to law and literature analysis as limited utility
and a lack of typicality.169 The fact that literature tends to be fiction
may enhance this criticism.170 Furthermore, the use of law and literature to support a more contextual approach to the application of

343 (1994) (book review); Charles R. Lawrence III, Foreword: Race, Multiculturalism,
and the Jurisprudenceof Transformation, 47 STAN. L. REv. 819, 838-39 (1995) (arguing
that the colorblind approach is used by some politicians as a tool with which to
perpetuate racism); Jerome McCristal Culp, Jr., Colorblind Remedies and the Intersectionality of Oppression: Policy Arguments Masqueradingas Moral Claims, 69 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 162 (1994); Jerome McCristal Culp, Jr. et al., Foreword:A New Journal of Color in a
"Colorblind" World: Race and Community, 1 AFRICAN-AM. L. & POL'Y. REP. 1 (1994).
165.
166.

SHAKESPEARE, THE MERCHANT OF VENICE (10th ed. 1888).
Debora L. Threedy describes this fallacy of contract quite pointedly:
In the crass, competitive world of Venice, contract law allows the
antagonists, Shylock and Antonio, to enter into a relationship with
one another, but that relationship remains basically adversarial. The
relationship based upon contract (law) creates no trust or intimacy
between Shylock and Antonio, and it is no surprise that it ends in a
duel in court, with its winners and losers.

Threedy, supra note 85, at 14-15. I would be remiss not to acknowledge that Merchant of Venice includes other societal issues and themes of a fractious nature. My
goal here is to highlight only the story's revelation of the failings of contractual rules.
167. See supra notes 80, 84 and accompanying text.
168. See supra notes 92-97 and accompanying text.
169. See Farber & Sherry, Telling Stories, supra note 92, at 854; Johnson, Defending
the Use of Narrative, supra note 93, at 807; Toni M. Massaro, Empathy, Legal Storytelling, and the Rule of Law: New Words, Old Wounds?, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2099, 2126 (1989).
170. Storytelling can be based in truth or fiction, while literature has a substantial
foundation in fiction. This constitutes a distinguishing feature of the two genres. Yet
this minuscule distinction does not diminish literature's analytical import. The
illustrative nature of literature serves as a superb evaluative tool, since the testing of
legal principles in fiction is generally without human consequence. Fiction often
springs from real world experiences. For example, PLACES IN THE HEART was based
on the early life of its writer, Robert Benton. See supra note 104 and accompanying
text. Likewise, an actual trial inspired John Grisham's idea for the story in A TIME TO
KILL. See supra notes 127, 142 and accompanying text. Having some basis in reality
should heighten, to some extent, the probative value of analysis through literature.
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contract rules can highlight theoretical conflict between fairness,
individualism, and preservation of the marketplace.171
Despite the aforementioned criticisms, the analytical revelations
provided by law and literature test the relevancy of contractual rules
as applied to bargaining circumstances. The context provided by the
imagination of authors who interpret human experiences can help
portray the effect of law on human relationships. These revelations
can be valuable in assessing the law's efficacy before it impacts actual
bargaining relationships.
The analytical constructs of literature can also serve to bolster
remedial intervention into agreements that are inequitable. Despite its
flaws, contract law does have mechanisms to remedy bargain unfair1175
ness. Duress, 72 fraud,173 and undue influence, 74 can,
if proven,' 75
afford the victim some relief. Perhaps the most notable remedial
device to correct unfair bargains is unconscionability.' 76 But unconscionability, like other interventionist devices, suffers from
amorphousness, making it difficult to prove' 77 and, therefore, to
obtain as a remedy.' 7 Moreover, interventionist remedies such as
unconscionability contradict the objectives of the classical notion of
contract theory: the preservation of bargains that contain the elements of an enforceable agreement, made by autonomous

171. See Jay Feinman, Critical Approaches to Contract Law, 30 UCLA L. REV. 829
(1983) (discussing collectivism and individualism in modem contract law and noting
that decision-makers' failure to acknowledge these competing interests produces
inconsistent rules).
172. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
173. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
174. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
175. See infra note 180 and accompanying text.
176. See supra notes 21, 72-75 and accompanying text.
177. See infra note 180 and accompanying text.
178. See generally M. P. Ellinghaus, In Defense of Unconscionability, 78 YALE L.J. 757
(1969) (supporting the need for unconscionability in modem contract law); Richard
A. Epstein, Unconscionability:A CriticalReappraisal, 18 J.L. & ECON. 293 (1975) (noting
that the doctrine's generality could prompt its abuse); Arthur Allen Leff, Unconscionability and the Code-The Emperor's New Clause, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 485 (1967) (noting
the vagueness of U.C.C. § 2-302); Harry G. Prince, Unconscionabilityin California:A
Need for Restraint and Consistency, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 459, 482-86 (1995) (stating that
unconscionability, as generally applied in all jurisdictions that recognize the doctrine, is limited to application "at the time the contract was made" and delineating
the doctrine's general use); John A. Spanogle, Jr., Analyzing Unconscionability Problems, 117 U. PA. L. REV. 931 (1969) (noting that the doctrine suffers from vagueness
and should be applied only when both procedural and substantive conditions are
met).
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individuals of free will. ' 7 The invocation of such doctrines, therefore, always comes to the decision-maker under a cloud of
suspicion and with a daunting burden of proof .'
However, the analytical revelations of literature, coupled with
cognition, can test the bounds of the objective bargain and support
interventionist mechanisms of relief. Factual corroboration of flawed
behavior due to biases and beliefs should support the decisionmaker's grant of relief, regardless of the remedial mechanism employed.
CONCLUSION
It is life that shakes and rocks us; it is literature which stabilizes
and confirms. 8"
Literature sheds light on the weaknesses of contract doctrine
and simultaneously exposes a solution. Decision-makers cannot
simply rely on the sterility and formalism of classical contract theory
in the evaluation of bargains. They must appreciate the full dynamic
of the interpersonal exchange which often impacts bargaining conduct. Racial and gender stereotyping and other biases are often an
intrinsic part of this reality. The analytical features of the law and
literature movement serve to reveal that dynamic and weaken the
false security inherent in rigid contractual rules.
Recognition of human dynamics through law and literature
does not operate as a deconstructive force that reduces the relevance
of contract rules. Instead, the analysis afforded by this powerful
movement reveals contextual factors such as perception that, if
addressed by the decision-maker, make contract rules more
functional in the real world. Realism in the evaluation of bargains
reflects fidelity to the human dynamic in contracting and thereby
forms the foundational element for bargaining fairness and equity.

179. See supra notes 35-37 and accompanying text.
180. In cases dealing with the issues of duress, unconscionability, or undue influence, the burden of proof lies with the proponent. See Industrial Recycling Sys., Inc.
v. Ahneman Assocs., 892 F. Supp. 547 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (stating that the burden of
proof for duress lies with the asserting party); Comeau v. Mt. Carmel Med. Ctr., Inc.,
869 F. Supp. 858 (D. Kan. 1994); see also Earman Oil Co. v. Burroughs Corp., 625 F.2d
1291 (5th Cir. 1990); Pig Improvement Co. v. Middle States Holding Co., 943 F. Supp.
392 (D. Del. 1996) (holding that the burden of proof for unconscionability lies with
the claimant); Silling v. Erwin, 885 F. Supp. 881 (S.D. W.Va. 1995) (maintaining that
the person asserting undue influence has the burden of proof); Vails v. Southwestern
Bell Tel. Co., 504 F. Supp. 740 (W.D. Okla. 1980).
181.
WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY OF QUOTABLE DEFINITONS 332 (Eugene
E. Brussell, ed., 2d ed. 1988) (quoting Heathcote W. Garrold).

